[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Some scholars and policymakers who are concerned about the inequitable distribution of quality teachers suggest offering financial incentives for working in hard-to-staff schools. Previous studies have estimated compensating differentials using hedonic modeling, an approach potentially undermined by district-wide salary schedules and the lack of labor market competitiveness. To address this problem, we build hedonic wage models for both public and private schools using data from the 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey and the 2000 Census. Empirical estimates suggest that both public and private schools compensate teachers for some working conditions, but there also appear to be differences between public and private schools in the magnitude of the compensating differentials, particularly for teaching low-income students.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Previous research has established the returns to academic ability in the general labor market, and this paper investigates such returns in the teacher labor market. Using a nationally representative sample of public school teachers, I find that teachers who graduate from the most selective undergraduate institutions have salaries that are between 7% and 14% higher than those who graduate from the least selective colleges. An empirical investigation of the source of these returns reveals that the majority of this difference is due to high-ability teachers sorting into higher paying districts, though a non-trivial amount arises from within-district deviations from the salary schedule.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Most studies that have fueled alarm over the attrition and mobility rates of high-quality teachers have relied on proxy indicators of teacher quality, which recent research finds to be only weakly correlated with value-added measures of teachers' performance. We examine attrition and mobility of teachers using teacher value-added measures for early-career teachers in North Carolina public schools from 1996 to 2002. Our findings suggest that the most-effective teachers tend to stay in teaching and in specific schools. Contrary to common expectations, we do not find that more-effective teachers are more likely to leave more-challenging schools.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: This article presents a principal-agent model in the context of public schools to help explain the use of merit pay for teachers. The model considers how both the nature of teaching and the political costs of union resistance affect school district merit pay decisions. Our results support the idea that merit pay is more likely in environments where there is more performance information and less likely where teachers are unionized. The negative effect from unions, however, appears stronger than the positive effect of performance information. We also find that teachers in merit pay districts earn more than their counterparts in non-merit pay districts.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), the Evans School, the University of Washington, or project funders. CRPE Working Papers have not been subject to the Center's Quality Assurance Process.