Daniel Player

Mathematica Policy Research, Princeton, New Jersey, United States

Are you Daniel Player?

Claim your profile

Publications (8)3.07 Total impact

  • Source
    Dan Goldhaber, Betheny Gross, Daniel Player
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In this paper we examine the mobility of early-career teachers of varying quality, measured using value-added estimates of teacher performance. Unlike previous studies that have examined these issues, we focus on the variation in these effects across the effectiveness distribution. We find that, on average, more effective teachers tend to stay in their initial schools and in the teaching profession. But there also appears to be heterogeneity in mobility behavior across the performance distribution and evidence that teacher mobility is affected by student demographics and achievement levels. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
    Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 11/2011; 30(1):57 - 87. · 0.93 Impact Factor
  • Source
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Some scholars and policymakers who are concerned about the inequitable distribution of quality teachers suggest offering financial incentives for working in hard-to-staff schools. Previous studies have estimated compensating differentials using hedonic modeling, an approach potentially undermined by district-wide salary schedules and the lack of labor market competitiveness. To address this problem, we build hedonic wage models for both public and private schools using data from the 1999–2000 Schools and Staffing Survey and the 2000 Census. Empirical estimates suggest that both public and private schools compensate teachers for some working conditions, but there also appear to be differences between public and private schools in the magnitude of the compensating differentials, particularly for teaching low-income students.
    Economics of Education Review. 02/2010;
  • Daniel Player
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Because of the rigid salary structure in the public teacher labor market, principals may have the incentive to align classes favorably for high-quality teachers as a form of nonmonetary compensation. This article tests whether higher-quality teachers, holding other characteristics constant, tend to be matched with more favorable assignments. The findings show that elementary teachers with higher licensure exam scores and greater observed classroom success tend to be matched to students with higher prior math ability, fewer students with learning disabilities, fewer students eligible for subsidized lunch, and more female students. Several tests indicate that matching patterns are not entirely driven by parental pressure or the technology of learning, providing evidence that principals use class assignments as a way to compensate teachers. © 2009 American Education Finance Association
    Education Finance and Policy 01/2010; 5(1):82-103. · 1.07 Impact Factor
  • Daniel Player
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Previous research has established the returns to academic ability in the general labor market, and this paper investigates such returns in the teacher labor market. Using a nationally representative sample of public school teachers, I find that teachers who graduate from the most selective undergraduate institutions have salaries that are between 7% and 14% higher than those who graduate from the least selective colleges. An empirical investigation of the source of these returns reveals that the majority of this difference is due to high-ability teachers sorting into higher paying districts, though a non-trivial amount arises from within-district deviations from the salary schedule.
    Economics of Education Review 01/2009; 28(2):277-285. · 1.07 Impact Factor
  • Source
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), the Evans School, the University of Washington, or project funders. CRPE Working Papers have not been subject to the Center's Quality Assurance Process.
    07/2005;
  • Source
    Dan Goldhaber, Daniel Player
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), the Evans School, the University of Washington, or project funders. CRPE Working Papers have not been subject to the Center's Quality Assurance Process.
    Journal of Education Finance 01/2005; 30:211-230.
  • Dan Goldhaber, Betheny Gross, Daniel Player
    [show abstract] [hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Most studies that have fueled alarm over the attrition and mobility rates of high-quality teachers have relied on proxy indicators of teacher quality, which recent research finds to be only weakly correlated with value-added measures of teachers' performance. We examine attrition and mobility of teachers using teacher value-added measures for early-career teachers in North Carolina public schools from 1996 to 2002. Our findings suggest that the most-effective teachers tend to stay in teaching and in specific schools. Contrary to common expectations, we do not find that more-effective teachers are more likely to leave more-challenging schools.