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ABSTRACT: We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers that are programmed to follow
one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process,
fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects’ performances depend
on their opponents’ learning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage
in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms
are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.
KeywordsLearning-Fictitious play-Imitation-Reinforcement-Trial & error-Strategic teaching-Cournot duopoly-Experiments-Internet
JEL ClassificationC72-C91-C92-D43-L13
Economic Theory 04/2012; 43(3):407-430. · 0.66 Impact Factor
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ABSTRACT: Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate sick pay in the same way as they reciprocate wage payments? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Firms may benefit in two different ways: directly, from workers reciprocating higher sick pay with higher efforts; and indirectly, from self-selection of reciprocal workers into contracts with higher sick pay. Our main finding is that the direct effect is rather weak in terms of effort and negative in terms of profits. However, when there is competition among firms for workers, sick pay can become an important advantage. Consequently, competition leads to a higher provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market.
11/2008;
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ABSTRACT: We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.
11/2005;
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ABSTRACT: We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.
11/2005;
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ABSTRACT: I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear.
Games and Economic Behavior 01/2003; 43(1):137-152. · 0.83 Impact Factor
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ABSTRACT: Recently there has been much work on learning in games. However, learning usually means “learning about behavior of opponents” rather than “learning about the game” as such. Here we test in an experiment whether players in a repeated encounter can learn the payoff structures of their opponents by rewarding subjects for correct guesses. Our data allows to construct the games that subjects perceive to be playing, the subjective games. We find that subjects often play according to an equilibrium in their subjective game. However, subjective games frequently differ from the games actually played.
Games and Economic Behavior.
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ABSTRACT: The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention with student subjects in an experimental laboratory setting rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions. Both wages and replacement rates offered by competing employers are reciprocated by workers. However, replacement rates are only reciprocated as long as no minimum level is mandated. Although we observe adverse selection when workers have different exogenous probabilities for being absent from work, this does not lead to a market breakdown. In our experiment, mandating replacement rates actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of replacement rates by employers.
Journal of Public Economics.
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ABSTRACT: It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.
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ABSTRACT: Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.
Economics Letters.
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ABSTRACT: Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.
Economics Letters. 105(1):120-122.
