Myrthel Dogge

Publications of Myrthel Dogge

• When moving without volition: Implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects.

  Authors: Myrthel Dogge, Marloes Schaap, Ruud Custers, Daniel M Wegner, Henk Aarts

  Consciousness and cognition. 11/2011; 21(1):501-6.

  The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although thisThe conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent.

• Positive priming and intentional binding: eye-blink rate predicts reward information effects on the sense of agency.

  Authors: Henk Aarts, Erik Bijleveld, Ruud Custers, Myrthel Dogge, Merel Deelder, Dennis Schutter, Neeltje E M van Haren

  Social neuroscience. 09/2011; 7(1):105-12.

  Human society is strongly rooted in people's experiences of agency; that is, the pervasive feeling that one engages in voluntary behavior and causes one's own actions and resulting outcomes. RewardsHuman society is strongly rooted in people's experiences of agency; that is, the pervasive feeling that one engages in voluntary behavior and causes one's own actions and resulting outcomes. Rewards and positive affect play an important role in the control of voluntary action. However, the role of positive reward signals in the sense of agency is poorly understood. This study examined effects of reward-related information on the sense of agency by employing the intentional binding paradigm. This paradigm measures the extent to which actions and their effects subjectively shift together across time, reflecting a crucial component of people's sense of agency. Results showed that intentional binding is stronger when participants are primed with reward-related information via brief exposure to positive pictures. Interestingly, this positive priming effect was moderated by baseline eye-blink rates (an indirect marker of striatal dopaminergic functioning); reward-related information increased intentional binding mainly for participants displaying higher baseline eye-blink rates. These findings suggest a possible role for striatal dopamine activity in the process by which reward-related information shapes the way people see themselves as agents.