[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Problem statement: Against the backdrop of the 2009 scientific studies qualifying the cardiovascular and cerebrovascular benefits of aspirin, two interrelated questions are raised for investigation in this study. First, why may the government intervene in an otherwise private transaction between physician and patient and between drug manufacturer and buyer, when it involves contentious pharmacological information? Second, does government intervention make a difference in what these transacting parties would otherwise have chosen to do in its absence? Approach: An Internet literature search was performed, using query term combinations, to identify relevant aspirin studies. The search yielded 61 juried publications that met our predetermined criteria for inclusion and thematic analysis. Results: Variance exists within the mix of economic and non-economic literature on aspirin information regulation. The study identified 4 instances of market failure that offer some of the most compelling theoretical and practical considerations for public policy intervention in the context of the 2009 findings. However, there is also indication that the sense of increased protection arising from safety regulations could stimulate risky behavior that nullifies their net protective effects or benefits. Conclusion: It is not clear either from the surveyed literature or existing economic theory if, ceteris paribus, regulated information alters or modifies the marginal propensity of a physician to recommend, and a patient to consume, aspirin to prevent cardiovascular and cerebrovascular events, particularly heart attacks, strokes and vascular death. The study suggests the need for policy reinforcements to safety information, if market failures are to be efficiently addressed and risk compensating behavior reduced.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Problem statement: This was the first study ever done on the cost consequences of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) in Egypt or any other developing/industrializing country. The following questions were empirically investigated: What are the economic costs of ASD in Egypt and how do they compare with developed/industrialized countries? Why are cost consequences important in formulating ASD policy in Egypt and comparable countries? Approach: A statistical sample of 185 households, with at least 1 autistic family member, in the Greater Cairo Region was surveyed. Households were drawn from 3 distinct geographic clusters (urban, suburban and rural). Cluster sampling results were Chi-square (χ2) tested. In addition, relevant ASD policies were content-analyzed. Results: We discovered that care and support for autistic Egyptian children and adults are typically based on a household-provider model, in contrast to western, institution-based models. ASD costs in Egypt largely derive from much higher investments in time, attention and behavioral adaptation on the part of family caregivers. Hence, autism cost consequences in Egypt significantly differ from many developed countries. Conclusion: Opportunity and transaction costs, feedback effects and spillover consequences of the household-provider model should be carefully considered in health policy formulation. Making autism care and support available, affordable and reliable should be a major health concern of the state.