Refet S. G�rkaynak

Bilkent University, Engüri, Ankara, Turkey

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Publications (3)0 Total impact

  • Source
    Refet S. G�rkaynak · Brian P. Sack · Jonathan H. Wright
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    ABSTRACT: We develop a method for measuring the amount of insurance the portfolio of government liabilities provides against scal shocks, and apply it to postwar US data. We de ne scal shocks as surprises in defense spending. Our results indicate that the US federal government is partially hedged against wars and other surprise increases in defense expenditures. Seven percent of the total cost of defense spending shocks in the postwar era was absorbed by lower real returns on the federal government's outstanding liabilities. More than half of this is due to reductions in expected future, rather than contemporaneous, holding returns on government debt. This implies that changes in US government's scal position help predict future bond returns. Our results also have implications for active management of government debt.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2008; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1327082
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    Michael Ehrmann · Marcel Fratzscher · Refet S. G�rkaynak · Eric T. Swanson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
    SSRN Electronic Journal 09/2007; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1026402
  • Source
    Refet S. G�rkaynak · Andrew T. Levin · Eric T. Swanson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper calculates indices of central bank autonomy (CBA) for 163 central banks as of end-2003, and comparable indices for a subgroup of 68 central banks as of the end of the 1980s. The results confirm strong improvements in both economic and political CBA over the past couple of decades, although more progress is needed to boost political autonomy of the central banks in emerging market and developing countries. Our analysis confirms that greater CBA has on average helped to maintain low inflation levels. The paper identifies four broad principles of CBA that have been shared by the majority of countries. Significant differences exist in the area of banking supervision where many central banks have retained a key role. Finally, we discuss the sequencing of reforms to separate the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 263–296. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.25; published online 23 September 2008
    SSRN Electronic Journal 03/2006; 8(2006-09). DOI:10.2139/ssrn.892400