Andrzej Bednarczyk

Publications of Andrzej Bednarczyk

• [Peter Simon Pallas (1741-1811). The structure of the organic world and the notion of species. On the bicentenary of the death of P. S. Pallas].

  Authors: Andrzej Bednarczyk

  Kwartalnik historii nauki i techniki : Kwartal'nyĭ zhurnal istorii nauki i tekhniki -. 01/2010; 55(2):7-68.

  An attempt has been made in the current paper to dispel two myths concerning Peter Simon Pallas, myths which have led historians of biology to distort the picture of some of the general biologicalAn attempt has been made in the current paper to dispel two myths concerning Peter Simon Pallas, myths which have led historians of biology to distort the picture of some of the general biological ideas developed by that eminent naturalist of the Age of Enlightenment. The first point dealt with in the paper involves the myth that Pallas had allegedly drafted a 'tree of life' diagram, one of the many graphic representations of this kind to appear in later times, illustrating the structure of the organic world. The tree, of which Pallas merely left a short description (but not a depiction), took--in the articles of authors who wrote about it--a variety of graphic forms (largely dependent on the authors' pictorial inventiveness), with all the authors assuring the readers that they illustrated their reasoning with the help of Pallas's tree of life, but never mentioning that it was they themseIves who had drawn it. The current paper presents a juxtaposition of a number of such diagrams, drawn by different authors: the great diversity of the diagrams is sufficient proof that the existence of one, original 'Pallas tree' is just a myth. Another aspect of the myth has to do with the view that the tree supposedly illustrated phylogenetic dependencies - in fact, Pallas described affinity relationships between groups in the animal world. The present paper investigates how the 'tree of life' myth has developed, and reveals the mechanism that has most likely led to the myth being perpetuated in writings on the history of biology. The second issue discussed in the current paper relates to the myth of how Pallas's general views on biology allegedly evolved. The naturalist was supposed to have moved from transformism (characteristic of early stages of his work) to the idea of the immutability of species, formed in the period of his full scientific maturity. The current paper proves, inter alia on the basis of little known and not easily accessible writings by the scholar, that Pallas espoused the Age of Enlightenment's deism, an important element of which was the idea of the immutability of species, to which Pallas steadfastly subscribed. On the other hand, the analysis presented in the paper has revealed that Pallas seemed to consider the problem of species on two planes: that of free-roaming wild species, which remained absolutely immutable, and that of domesticated species, which did manifest some mutability, largely sustained by human effort but never transgressing species boundaries. It was also--and only--under domestication that monsters appeared. Pallas did contemplate, not without much hesitation, teratogenesis as a possible mechanism behind speciation, but--given the lethal character of monstrous modifications--he did not treat it as the real mechanism of speciation.

• [Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829). A dispute on the mechanism of evolution. On the bicentenary of the publication of Philosophie Zoologique (1809)].

  Authors: Andrzej Bednarczyk

  Kwartalnik historii nauki i techniki : Kwartal'nyĭ zhurnal istorii nauki i tekhniki -. 01/2009; 54(3-4):31-98.

  The author of the paper has made an attempt to prove that a teleological interpretation of Lamarck's theory is false. It is unwarranted to attribute to Lamarck the idea that a living organism has anThe author of the paper has made an attempt to prove that a teleological interpretation of Lamarck's theory is false. It is unwarranted to attribute to Lamarck the idea that a living organism has an internal tendency to complicate its organization and to improve its mode of functioning; such a concept is not confirmed by existing textual evidence, and it is also in direct conflict with Lamarck's undisputed mechanicism. The proof presented in the paper begins with an outline of the history of this false interpretation, including the opinions of Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin. As the tendency is ascribed also to nature itself, the next phase of the proof has involved reconstructing the fully ateleological notion of nature to which Lamarck subscribed. Supposed evidence for the tendency is said to be provided by the existence of a series in which the organization of a living body grows from the simplest to the most complex. That is why the author of the current paper has analysed the concept of série animale used by Lamarck in some detail, in order to demonstrate that it is typological in character, and has nothing to do with the tendency that is allegedly inherent in the nature of an organism. Also presented in the paper, in connection with the construction of the series, is the problem of spontaneous generation, which was made complicated by Lamarck. Finally, the very notion of tendency is analysed and confronted with Lamarck's text; the latter in fact does not contain any explanations that would be teleological in the strict sense of the word. The analysis has enabled the author of the current paper to conduct an exegesis of the fragment of Lamarck's text which might give grounds to it being construed in terms of an explanation resorting to the notion of tendency, and possible interpretations of that fragment have been presented. The paper ends with a description of the mechanism which, according to Lamarck, is responsible for the rise in complexity of an organism that has the nature of a machine; such a mechanism leaves no place for any tendency to be in operation.

• [Georges Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1701-1788). The main ideas of his science of life. On the tricentenary of the French naturalist's birthday]

  Authors: Andrzej Bednarczyk

  Kwartalnik historii nauki i techniki : Kwartal'nyĭ zhurnal istorii nauki i tekhniki -. 02/2007; 52(3-4):55-95.

  The aim of the paper is construct an outline of G. L. Buffon's ontology, epistemology and theoretical foundations of biology, using the general ideas recovered from and revealed in the voluminousThe aim of the paper is construct an outline of G. L. Buffon's ontology, epistemology and theoretical foundations of biology, using the general ideas recovered from and revealed in the voluminous text of Buffon's Histoire naturelle, which underpinned his biology and the natural science of the Age of Enlightenment, and which Buffon never expounded in a separate work. It was deism that Buffon used as a theoretical assumption that could facilitate explaining of where to look for the origin of the uniformity and order that prevailed in nature, and for the source of the natural laws that were being discovered. It was naturalism, a common cognitive attitude among the natural scientists of the Age of Enlightenment, that Buffon expressed in his view that the created and embodied nature was the only object of cognition within whose bounds the cognizant should remain in the process of cognition, by explaining it through itself. Indeed, Buffon made the notion of nature, which sometimes reveals pantheistic overtones, his main theoretical category. The naturalist Buffon was also a universalist in that he conceived of nature as the infinite universe and entered into it cognitively. He proved his universalist stance by (i) propounding the cosmogonic hypothesis, (ii) formulating the concept of life dispersed throughout the universe, and (iii) viewing the process of Earth's formation as one of the many occurring in the universe, and of life on Earth as one of the many biospheres. Buffon was also a determinist, which can be seen in his belief that the object of nature show stability in their mutability, and unity in their variability, which is the effect of immutable laws which belong to the nature of the world. This determinism showed in Buffon's views in three varieties: causal determinism, co-existential (or morphological) determinism and statistical determinism; he did not accept finalism. Buffon was the author of the principle of the conservation of life, according to which the amount of life in the universe is constant, life is an autonomous quality, and animate matter is as ancient as inanimate matter. This principle forms part of the concept of organic corpuscles, a concept which is not without its internal contradictions. Prominent in this concept, the best known among Buffon's theoretical concepts, is the idea of corpuscularism, and ancient concept, related to that of atomism, which found an application in the biology of the Age of Enlightenment in its qualitative variety. Continualism, an idea opposed to that of corpuscularism, manifested itself in Buffon's philosophy in the form of the concept of the chain of being, which Buffon devised basing on one morphological type which was subject to modification. Connected with this latter, specific way of modelling the structure of nature is the notion of species. Species, discovered by Buffon in nature and viewed as existing in nature in a real way, had a physiological character (in that species were formed by individuals that produced a fertile offspring) and endured in an immutable way (irrespective of the suggestion formulated by historians of biology that species were mutable). As a natural scientist, Buffon was an empiric, or even an empiricist. His attempts at experiments, such as the model experiment in trying to develop the cosmogonic hypothesis, are among the rare exceptions. It was this hypothesis, and the history of the Earth that was intertwined in it, that led Buffon to adopt the concept of geological time and to postulate that irreversible events occurred within it, thus discovering something that was reminiscent of the history of human society. Although Buffon used many very general theoretical notions and hypothetical concepts, this broad view of nature cannot be said-- in spite of the opinions of numerous historians--to have formed a system. It does, however, remain a comprehensive vision of nature, an attempt at an ambitious synthesis in the field of natural science.

• [Caspar Friedrich Wolff (1734-1794). The concept of epigenesis and the problem of spontaneous generation]

  Authors: Andrzej Bednarczyk

  Kwartalnik historii nauki i techniki : Kwartal'nyĭ zhurnal istorii nauki i tekhniki -. 02/2005; 50(3-4):59-86.

  The link between the notion of epigenesis and that of spontaneous generation does not seem complicated when it is viewed in theoretical terms or when it is approached in a pure model form. However,The link between the notion of epigenesis and that of spontaneous generation does not seem complicated when it is viewed in theoretical terms or when it is approached in a pure model form. However, once any of its particular manifestations in the history of biology is analysed, the interrelationship between the two notions ceases to be unequivocal. One example of that comes with the first fully-fledged concept of epigenesis, based on careful observation of embryonic development, presented by Caspar Friedrich Wolff in the 18th century. The process of development that an act of spontaneous generation has given rise to cannot, of course, be anything else but one of epigenesis. In this sense, epigenesis constitutes a necessary condition for spontaneous generation, but is not a sufficient condition, i.e. not every process of development through epigenesis has at its source an act of spontaneous generation. Evidence that Wolff was inclined towards the concept of spontaneous generation comes from the presence in his works of a notion described by the Latin term ortus (emergence). That notion--together with that of an organic body--is subject to detailed analysis in the current paper. If the process of spontaneous generation is understood as a process of emergence in nature of what is animate and organic, from what is inanimate and non-organic, and as a process in which living beings are not involved, but a living being is its outcome, then the notion of ortus is close in meaning to the notion of spontaneous generation. However, the deistic and theological philosophical foundation of Wolff's concept of epigenesis is in conflict with the notion of spontaneous generation. It seems that Wolff's notion of ortus can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as as result of the theoretical extrapolation in time applied by Wolff to the usual way in which organic bodies emerge (the process is always given rise to by a nonorganic body, supplied by another organic body), all the way back to that the distant moment when the first organic body in time was to emerge; this extrapolation has been reconstructed in detail in the current paper. Secondly, the notion of ortus can be also interpreted as a special kind of heterogenesis, a process which is given rise to by an organic body, but which produces living beings that do not deserve the name of organic bodies--beings that are poorly differentiated in terms of morphology and organization, and thus devoid of distinct species membership, such as simple algae, moulds, internal parasites etc. If that is a correct interpretation, then in neither case would Wolff's ideas have anything to do with real spontaneous generation in the strict sense.