Justin J Couchman

Publications of Justin J Couchman

• The highs and lows of theoretical interpretation in animal-metacognition research.

  Authors: J David Smith, Justin J Couchman, Michael J Beran

  Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences. 05/2012; 367(1594):1297-309.

  Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether animals share thisHumans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether animals share this cognitive capacity, and thus animal metacognition has become an influential research area within comparative psychology. Researchers have explored this question by testing many species using perception and memory paradigms. There is an emerging consensus that animals share functional parallels with humans' conscious metacognition. Of course, this research area poses difficult issues of scientific inference. How firmly should we hold the line in insisting that animals' performances are low-level and associative? How high should we set the bar for concluding that animals share metacognitive capacities with humans? This area offers a constructive case study for considering theoretical problems that often confront comparative psychologists. The authors present this case study and address diverse issues of scientific judgement and interpretation within comparative psychology.

• Do actions speak louder than words? A comparative perspective on implicit versus explicit meta-cognition and theory of mind.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Michael J Beran, Mariana V C Coutinho, Joseph Boomer, Alexandria Zakrzewski, Barbara Church, J David Smith

  The British journal of developmental psychology. 03/2012; 30(Pt 1):210-21.

  Research in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they knowResearch in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they know and when they do not know. In contrast, animals have generally not shown robust theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. Comparative research uses methods that are non-verbal, and thus might easily be labelled 'implicit' using the terminology of traditional human cognition. However, comparative psychology has developed several non-verbal methods that are designed to test for aspects of meta-cognition that - while perhaps not fully explicit - go beyond the merely implicit or associative. We believe similar methods might be useful to developmental researchers who work with young children, and may provide a sound empirical alternative to verbal reports. Comparative psychology has moved away from all-or-none categorical labels (e.g., 'implicit' vs. 'explicit') towards a theoretical framework that contains a spectrum of mental abilities ranging from implicit to explicit, and from associative to cognitive to fully conscious. We discuss how this same framework might be applied to developmental psychology when it comes to implicit versus explicit processing and ToM.

• The experience of agency in sequence production with altered auditory feedback.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Robertson Beasley, Peter Q Pfordresher

  Consciousness and cognition. 11/2011; 21(1):186-203.

  When speaking or producing music, people rely in part on auditory feedback - the sounds associated with the performed action. Three experiments investigated the degree to which alterations ofWhen speaking or producing music, people rely in part on auditory feedback - the sounds associated with the performed action. Three experiments investigated the degree to which alterations of auditory feedback (AAF) during music performances influence the experience of agency (i.e., the sense that your actions led to auditory events) and the possible link between agency and the disruptive effect of AAF on production. Participants performed short novel melodies from memory on a keyboard. Auditory feedback during performances was manipulated with respect to its pitch contents and/or its synchrony with actions. Participants rated their experience of agency after each trial. In all experiments, AAF reduced judgments of agency across conditions. Performance was most disrupted (measured by error rates and slowing) when AAF led to an ambiguous experience of agency, suggesting that there may be some causal relationship between agency and disruption. However, analyses revealed that these two effects were probably independent. A control experiment verified that performers can make veridical judgments of agency.

• Self-agency in rhesus monkeys.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman

  Biology letters. 07/2011; 8(1):39-41.

  Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have shown the ability to monitor their own mental states, but fail the mirror self-recognition test. In humans, the sense of self-agency is closely related toRhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have shown the ability to monitor their own mental states, but fail the mirror self-recognition test. In humans, the sense of self-agency is closely related to self-awareness, and results from monitoring the relationship between intentional, sensorimotor and perceptual information. Humans and rhesus monkeys were trained to move a computer icon with a joystick while a distractor icon partially matched their movements. Both humans and monkeys were able to monitor and identify the icon they were controlling, suggesting they have some understanding of self-agency.

• The learning of exclusive-or categories by monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

  Authors: J David Smith, Mariana V C Coutinho, Justin J Couchman

  Journal of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 01/2011; 37(1):20-9.

  A central question in categorization research concerns the categories that animals and humans learn naturally and well. Here, the authors examined monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) and humans' (Homo sapiens)A central question in categorization research concerns the categories that animals and humans learn naturally and well. Here, the authors examined monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) and humans' (Homo sapiens) learning of the important class of exclusive-or (XOR) categories. Both species exhibited--through a sustained level of ongoing errors--substantial difficulty learning XOR category tasks at 3 stimulus dimensionalities. Clearly, both species brought a linear-separability constraint to XOR category learning. This constraint illuminates the primate category-learning system from which that of humans arose, and it has theoretical implications concerning the evolution of cognitive systems for categorization. The present data also clarify the role of exemplar-specific processes in fully explaining XOR category learning, and suggest that humans sometimes overcome their linear-separability constraint through the use of language and verbalization.

• Refining the visual-cortical hypothesis in category learning.

  Authors: Mariana V C Coutinho, Justin J Couchman, Joshua S Redford, J David Smith

  Brain and cognition. 11/2010; 74(2):88-96.

  Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to aParticipants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant's exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.

• Beyond stimulus cues and reinforcement signals: a new approach to animal metacognition.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Mariana V C Coutinho, Michael J Beran, J David Smith

  Journal of comparative psychology (Washington, D.C. : 1983). 11/2010; 124(4):356-68.

  Some metacognition paradigms for nonhuman animals encourage the alternative explanation that animals avoid difficult trials based only on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion. To explore thisSome metacognition paradigms for nonhuman animals encourage the alternative explanation that animals avoid difficult trials based only on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion. To explore this possibility, we placed humans and monkeys in successive uncertainty-monitoring tasks that were qualitatively different, eliminating many associative cues that might support transfer across tasks. In addition, task transfer occurred under conditions of deferred and rearranged feedback-both species completed blocks of trials followed by summary feedback. This ensured that animals received no trial-by-trial reinforcement. Despite distancing performance from associative cues, humans and monkeys still made adaptive uncertainty responses by declining the most difficult trials. These findings suggest that monkeys' uncertainty responses could represent a higher-level, decisional process of cognitive monitoring, though that process need not involve full self-awareness or consciousness. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications concerning the status of reinforcement as the critical binding force in animal learning.

• Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Joseph Boomer, Mariana V C Coutinho, J David Smith

  The Behavioral and brain sciences. 06/2010; 33(2-3):207-8.

  That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitaryThat humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating "concept" makes this more difficult.

• Rules and resemblance: their changing balance in the category learning of humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Mariana V C Coutinho, J David Smith

  Journal of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 04/2010; 36(2):172-83.

  In an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to aIn an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to a single-dimensional rule or to overall family resemblance. Humans learning intentionally deliberately adopted rule-based strategies; humans learning incidentally adopted family resemblance strategies. The present authors replicated Kemler Nelson's human experiment and found a similar dissociation. They also extended her paradigm so as to evaluate the balance between rules and family resemblance in determining the category decisions of rhesus monkeys. Monkeys heavily favored the family resemblance strategy. Formal models showed that even after many sessions and thousands of trials, they spread attention across all stimulus dimensions rather than focus on a single, criterial dimension that could also produce perfect categorization.

• The psychological organization of "uncertainty" responses and "middle" responses: A dissociation in capuchin monkeys ().

  Authors: Michael J Beran, J David Smith, Mariana V C Coutinho, Joseph Boomer, Justin J Couchman

  Journal of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 08/2009; 35(3):371-81.

  Some studies of nonhuman animals' metacognitive capacity encourage competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of trial-decline responses by animals in uncertainty-monitoring tasks. To evaluate theSome studies of nonhuman animals' metacognitive capacity encourage competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of trial-decline responses by animals in uncertainty-monitoring tasks. To evaluate the force of these behavioral descriptions, the authors presented 6 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) with 2 density discrimination tasks between sparse and dense stimuli. In one task, difficult trials with stimuli near the middle of the density continuum could be declined through an "uncertainty" response. In the other task, making a "middle" response to the same stimuli was rewarded. In Experiment 1, capuchins essentially did not use the uncertainty response, but they did use the middle response. In Experiment 2, the authors replicated this result with 5 of 6 monkeys while equating the overall pace and reinforcement structure of the 2 tasks, although 1 monkey also showed appropriate use of the uncertainty response. These results challenge a purely associative interpretation of some uncertainty-monitoring performances by monkeys while sharpening the theoretical question concerning the nature of the psychological signal that occasions uncertainty responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

• Metacognition is prior.

  Authors: Justin J Couchman, Mariana V C Coutinho, Michael J Beran, J David Smith

  The Behavioral and brain sciences. 05/2009; 32(2):142.

  We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-priorWe agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.

• The comparative study of metacognition: sharper paradigms, safer inferences.

  Authors: J David Smith, Michael J Beran, Justin J Couchman, Mariana V C Coutinho

  Psychonomic bulletin & review. 09/2008; 15(4):679-91.

  Results that point to animals' metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden, given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. In this article, formal models are used to evaluate the force ofResults that point to animals' metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden, given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. In this article, formal models are used to evaluate the force of these descriptions. One example is that many existing studies have directly rewarded so-called uncertainty responses. Modeling confirms that this practice is an interpretative danger because it supports associative processes and encourages simpler interpretations. Another example is that existing studies raise the concern that animals avoid difficult stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored, but because of aversion given error-causing or reinforcement-lean stimuli. Modeling also justifies this concern and shows that this problem is not addressed by the common practice of comparing performance on chosen and forced trials. The models and related discussion have utility for metacognition researchers and theorists broadly, because they specify the experimental operations that will best indicate a metacognitive capacity in humans or animals by eliminating alternative behavioral accounts.

• The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

  Authors: J David Smith, Joshua S Redford, Sarah M Haas, Mariana V C Coutinho, Justin J Couchman

  Journal of experimental psychology. Animal behavior processes. 08/2008; 34(3):361-74.

  The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, andThe authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.

• Refining the visual-cortical hypothesis in category learning

  Authors: Mariana V.C. Coutinho, Justin J. Couchman, Joshua S. Redford, J. David Smith

  Brain and Cognition.

  Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to aParticipants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant’s exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.