Daniel M Wegner

Publications of Daniel M Wegner

• When moving without volition: Implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects.

  Authors: Myrthel Dogge, Marloes Schaap, Ruud Custers, Daniel M Wegner, Henk Aarts

  Consciousness and cognition. 11/2011; 21(1):501-6.

  The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although thisThe conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied. Participants made temporal judgements concerning a key press and a tone, while they learned to consider themselves as the cause of the effect or not. Results showed that implied self-causation (vs. no implied self-causation) increased temporal binding. Since intrinsic motor cues of movement were absent, these results suggest that sensory evidence about the key press caused binding in retrospect and in line with the participant's sense of being an agent.

• Setting free the bears: escape from thought suppression.

  Authors: Daniel M Wegner

  The American psychologist. 11/2011; 66(8):671-80.

  A person who is asked to think aloud while trying not to think about a white bear will typically mention the bear once a minute. So how can people suppress unwanted thoughts? This article examines aA person who is asked to think aloud while trying not to think about a white bear will typically mention the bear once a minute. So how can people suppress unwanted thoughts? This article examines a series of indirect thought suppression techniques and therapies that have been explored for their efficacy as remedies for unwanted thoughts of all kinds and that offer some potential as means for effective suppression. The strategies that have some promise include focused distraction, stress and load avoidance, thought postponement, exposure and paradoxical approaches, acceptance and commitment, meditation, mindfulness, focused breathing, attention training, self-affirmation, hypnosis, and disclosure and writing. Many of these strategies entail thinking about and accepting unwanted thoughts rather than suppressing them--and so, setting free the bears. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).

• Google effects on memory: cognitive consequences of having information at our fingertips.

  Authors: Betsy Sparrow, Jenny Liu, Daniel M Wegner

  Science (New York, N.Y.). 08/2011; 333(6043):776-8.

  The advent of the Internet, with sophisticated algorithmic search engines, has made accessing information as easy as lifting a finger. No longer do we have to make costly efforts to find the thingsThe advent of the Internet, with sophisticated algorithmic search engines, has made accessing information as easy as lifting a finger. No longer do we have to make costly efforts to find the things we want. We can "Google" the old classmate, find articles online, or look up the actor who was on the tip of our tongue. The results of four studies suggest that when faced with difficult questions, people are primed to think about computers and that when people expect to have future access to information, they have lower rates of recall of the information itself and enhanced recall instead for where to access it. The Internet has become a primary form of external or transactive memory, where information is stored collectively outside ourselves.

• More dead than dead: perceptions of persons in the persistent vegetative state.

  Authors: Kurt Gray, T Anne Knickman, Daniel M Wegner

  Cognition. 07/2011; 121(2):275-80.

  Patients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) may be biologically alive, but these experiments indicate that people see PVS as a state curiously more dead than dead. Experiment 1 found that PVSPatients in persistent vegetative state (PVS) may be biologically alive, but these experiments indicate that people see PVS as a state curiously more dead than dead. Experiment 1 found that PVS patients were perceived to have less mental capacity than the dead. Experiment 2 explained this effect as an outgrowth of afterlife beliefs, and the tendency to focus on the bodies of PVS patients at the expense of their minds. Experiment 3 found that PVS is also perceived as "worse" than death: people deem early death better than being in PVS. These studies suggest that people perceive the minds of PVS patients as less valuable than those of the dead - ironically, this effect is especially robust for those high in religiosity.

• Mistaking randomness for free will.

  Authors: Jeffrey P Ebert, Daniel M Wegner

  Consciousness and cognition. 02/2011; 20(3):965-71.

  Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior toBelief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents' behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior--one's own or another's--can be mistaken for free will.

• Distortions of mind perception in psychopathology.

  Authors: Kurt Gray, Adrianna C Jenkins, Andrea S Heberlein, Daniel M Wegner

  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 01/2011; 108(2):477-9.

  It has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a 2D framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for an integrative understanding of some disorders. WeIt has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a 2D framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for an integrative understanding of some disorders. We examined the covariation of mind perception with three subclinical syndromes--autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy--and found that each presents a unique mind-perception profile. Autism-spectrum disorder involves reduced perception of agency in adult humans. Schizotypy involves increased perception of both agency and experience in entities generally thought to lack minds. Psychopathy involves reduced perception of experience in adult humans, children, and animals. Disorders are differentially linked with the over- or underperception of agency and experience in a way that helps explain their real-world consequences.

• Causes and consequences of mind perception.

  Authors: Adam Waytz, Kurt Gray, Nicholas Epley, Daniel M Wegner

  Trends in cognitive sciences. 08/2010; 14(8):383-8.

  Perceiving others' minds is a crucial component of social life. People do not, however, always ascribe minds to other people, and sometimes ascribe minds to non-people (e.g. God, gadgets). ThisPerceiving others' minds is a crucial component of social life. People do not, however, always ascribe minds to other people, and sometimes ascribe minds to non-people (e.g. God, gadgets). This article reviews when mind perception occurs, when it does not, and why mind perception is important. Causes of mind perception stem both from the perceiver and perceived, and include the need for social connection (perceiver) and a similarity to oneself (perceived). Mind perception also has profound consequences for both the perceiver and perceived. Ascribing mind confers an entity moral rights and also makes its actions meaningful. Understanding the causes and consequences of mind perception can explain when this most social of cognitive skills will be used, and why it matters.

• The neural substrates of action identification.

  Authors: Abigail A Marsh, Megan N Kozak, Daniel M Wegner, Marguerite E Reid, Henry H Yu, R J R Blair

  Social cognitive and affective neuroscience. 02/2010; 5(4):392-403.

  Mentalization is the process by which an observer views a target as possessing higher cognitive faculties such as goals, intentions and desires. Mentalization can be assessed using actionMentalization is the process by which an observer views a target as possessing higher cognitive faculties such as goals, intentions and desires. Mentalization can be assessed using action identification paradigms, in which observers choose mentalistic (goals-focused) or mechanistic (action-focused) descriptions of targets' actions. Neural structures that play key roles in inferring goals and intentions from others' observed or imagined actions include temporo-parietal junction, ventral premotor cortex and extrastriate body area. We hypothesized that these regions play a role in action identification as well. Data collected using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) confirmed our predictions that activity in ventral premotor cortex and middle temporal gyrus near the extrastriate body area varies both as a function of the valence of the target and the extent to which actions are identified as goal-directed. In addition, the inferior parietal lobule is preferentially engaged when participants identify the actions of mentalized targets. Functional connectivity analyses suggest support from other regions, including the medial prefrontal cortex and amygdala, during mentalization. We found correlations between action identification and Autism Quotient scores, suggesting that understanding the neural correlates of action identification may enhance our understanding of the underpinnings of essential social cognitive processes.

• Time warp: Authorship shapes the perceived timing of actions and events.

  Authors: Jeffrey P Ebert, Daniel M Wegner

  Consciousness and cognition. 11/2009;

  It has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one's action and inferred effect seem closer in time than theyIt has been proposed that inferring personal authorship for an event gives rise to intentional binding, a perceptual illusion in which one's action and inferred effect seem closer in time than they otherwise would (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Using a novel, naturalistic paradigm, we conducted two experiments to test this hypothesis and examine the relationship between binding and self-reported authorship. In both experiments, an important authorship indicator - consistency between one's action and a subsequent event - was manipulated, and its effects on binding and self-reported authorship were measured. Results showed that action-event consistency enhanced both binding and self-reported authorship, supporting the hypothesis that binding arises from an inference of authorship. At the same time, evidence for a dissociation emerged, with consistency having a more robust effect on self-reports than on binding. Taken together, these results suggest that binding and self-reports reveal different aspects of the sense of authorship.

• Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind.

  Authors: Kurt Gray, Daniel M Wegner

  Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 11/2009;

  Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people's normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying toBelieving in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people's normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God's unique mind is due, the authors suggest, to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine.

• Learning the Futility of the Thought Suppression Enterprise in Normal Experience and in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder.

  Authors: Sadia Najmi, Hannah Reese, Sabine Wilhelm, Jeanne Fama, Celeste Beck, Daniel M Wegner

  Behavioural and cognitive psychotherapy. 10/2009;

  Background: The belief that we can control our thoughts is not inevitably adaptive, particularly when it fuels mental control activities that have ironic unintended consequences. The conviction thatBackground: The belief that we can control our thoughts is not inevitably adaptive, particularly when it fuels mental control activities that have ironic unintended consequences. The conviction that the mind can and should be controlled can prompt people to suppress unwanted thoughts, and so can set the stage for the intrusive return of those very thoughts. An important question is whether or not these beliefs about the control of thoughts can be reduced experimentally. One possibility is that behavioral experiments aimed at revealing the ironic return of suppressed thoughts might create a lesson that could reduce unrealistic beliefs about the control of thoughts. Aims: The present research assessed the influence of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts in a non-clinical sample, and among individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Method: In Study 1, we assessed the effect of the thought suppression demonstration on beliefs about the control of thoughts among low and high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population (N = 62). In Study 2, we conducted a similar study with individuals with OCD (N = 29). Results: Results suggest that high obsessive individuals in the non-clinical population are able to learn the futility of suppression through the thought suppression demonstration and to alter their faulty beliefs about the control of thoughts; however, for individuals with OCD, the demonstration may be insufficient for altering underlying beliefs. Conclusions: For individuals with OCD, the connection between suppressing a neutral thought in the suppression demonstration and suppressing a personally relevant obsession may need to be stated explicitly in order to affect their obsessive beliefs.

• How to Think, Say, or Do Precisely the Worst Thing for Any Occasion.

  Authors: Daniel M Wegner

  Science (New York, N.Y.). 08/2009; 325(5936):48-50.

  In slapstick comedy, the worst thing that could happen usually does: The person with a sore toe manages to stub it, sometimes twice. Such errors also arise in daily life, and research traces theIn slapstick comedy, the worst thing that could happen usually does: The person with a sore toe manages to stub it, sometimes twice. Such errors also arise in daily life, and research traces the tendency to do precisely the worst thing to ironic processes of mental control. These monitoring processes keep us watchful for errors of thought, speech, and action and enable us to avoid the worst thing in most situations, but they also increase the likelihood of such errors when we attempt to exert control under mental load (stress, time pressure, or distraction). Ironic errors in attention and memory occur with identifiable brain activity and prompt recurrent unwanted thoughts; attraction to forbidden desires; expression of objectionable social prejudices; production of movement errors; and rebounds of negative experiences such as anxiety, pain, and depression. Such ironies can be overcome when effective control strategies are deployed and mental load is minimized.

• Moral typecasting: divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients.

  Authors: Kurt Gray, Daniel M Wegner

  Journal of personality and social psychology. 04/2009; 96(3):505-20.

  Moral agency is the capacity to do right or wrong, whereas moral patiency is the capacity to be a target of right or wrong. Through 7 studies, the authors explored moral typecasting-an inverseMoral agency is the capacity to do right or wrong, whereas moral patiency is the capacity to be a target of right or wrong. Through 7 studies, the authors explored moral typecasting-an inverse relation between perceptions of moral agency and moral patiency. Across a range of targets and situations, good- and evil-doers (moral agents) were perceived to be less vulnerable to having good and evil done to them. The recipients of good and evil (moral patients), in turn, were perceived as less capable of performing good or evil actions. Moral typecasting stems from the dyadic nature of morality and explains curious effects such as people's willingness to inflict greater pain on those who do good than those who do nothing.

• The sting of intentional pain.

  Authors: Kurt Gray, Daniel M Wegner

  Psychological science : a journal of the American Psychological Society / APS. 01/2009; 19(12):1260-2.

• Psychological effects of thought acceleration.

  Authors: Emily Pronin, Elana Jacobs, Daniel M Wegner

  Emotion (Washington, D.C.). 11/2008; 8(5):597-612.

  Six experiments found that manipulations that increase thought speed also yield positive affect. These experiments varied in both the methods used for accelerating thought (i.e., instructions toSix experiments found that manipulations that increase thought speed also yield positive affect. These experiments varied in both the methods used for accelerating thought (i.e., instructions to brainstorm freely, exposure to multiple ideas, encouragement to plagiarize others' ideas, performance of easy cognitive tasks, narration of a silent video in fast-forward, and experimentally controlled reading speed) and the contents of the thoughts that were induced (from thoughts about money-making schemes to thoughts of five-letter words). The results suggested that effects of thought speed on mood are partially rooted in the subjective experience of thought speed. The results also suggested that these effects can be attributed to the joy-enhancing effects of fast thinking (rather than only to the joy-killing effects of slow thinking). This work is inspired by observations of a link between "racing thoughts" and euphoria in cases of clinical mania, and potential implications of that observed link are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).

• The gravity of unwanted thoughts: Asymmetric priming effects in thought suppression.

  Authors: Sadia Najmi, Daniel M Wegner

  Consciousness and cognition. 04/2008; 17(1):114-24.

  An unwanted thought appears to be cued easily by reminders in the environment but often the thought itself seems to cue nothing more than the desire to eliminate it from consciousness. This unusualAn unwanted thought appears to be cued easily by reminders in the environment but often the thought itself seems to cue nothing more than the desire to eliminate it from consciousness. This unusual asymmetry in the way unwanted thoughts are linked to other thoughts was the focus of the present research. Participants who were asked to suppress a thought or to concentrate on it completed a task assessing the influence of priming on reaction time (RT) for word/non-word judgments. Results revealed that suppression under cognitive load produced asymmetric priming: Priming with the associate of a suppressed word speeded RT for the suppressed word, but priming with a suppressed word did not speed RT for associated words. These findings suggest that thought suppression induces an unusual form of cognitive accessibility in which movement of activation toward the suppressed thought from associates is facilitated but movement of activation away from the suppressed thought to associates is undermined.

• Thought suppression and self-injurious thoughts and behaviors.

  Authors: Sadia Najmi, Daniel M Wegner, Matthew K Nock

  Behaviour research and therapy. 09/2007; 45(8):1957-65.

  This study proposes and tests a theoretical model suggesting that the propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is associated with an increased presence and frequency of self-injurious thoughts andThis study proposes and tests a theoretical model suggesting that the propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is associated with an increased presence and frequency of self-injurious thoughts and behaviors (SITB). In the model, propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is hypothesized to be a cognitive mediator of the relationship between emotional reactivity and SITB, and is expected to be related to the extent to which SITB is initiated to escape from aversive emotions. Results of this cross-sectional study of adolescents (N=87) revealed that the self-reported propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is associated with the presence and frequency of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts. Furthermore, thought suppression partially mediates the relationship between emotional reactivity and the frequency of NSSI and suicidal ideation. Finally, adolescents with a higher tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts report engaging in NSSI in order to reduce aversive emotions rather than for social communication. Results are discussed within the framework of the negative reinforcement function of SITB.

• Timescale bias in the attribution of mind.

  Authors: Carey K Morewedge, Jesse Preston, Daniel M Wegner

  Journal of personality and social psychology. 08/2007; 93(1):1-11.

  In this research, the authors found that people use speed of movement to infer the presence of mind and mental attributes such as intention, consciousness, thought, and intelligence in other persons,In this research, the authors found that people use speed of movement to infer the presence of mind and mental attributes such as intention, consciousness, thought, and intelligence in other persons, animals, and objects. Participants in 4 studies exhibited timescale bias--perceiving human and nonhuman targets (animals, robots, and animations) as more likely to possess mental states when those targets moved at speeds similar to the speed of natural human movement, compared with when targets performed actions at speeds faster or slower than the speed of natural human movement.

• The role of thought suppression in building mental blocks.

  Authors: Megan Kozak, R Weylin Sternglanz, Uma Viswanathan, Daniel M Wegner

  Consciousness and cognition. 07/2007;

  This research examined the role of thought suppression in the formation of mental blocks. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to generate a series of creative associates for two target wordsThis research examined the role of thought suppression in the formation of mental blocks. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to generate a series of creative associates for two target words after initially suppressing a word that was semantically related to one of the two target words. Participants produced fewer responses, and experienced a greater sensation of being mentally blocked, when attempting to produce associates for the target word that was semantically related to the suppressed word. In Experiment 2, participants either thought about or suppressed a series of words prior to completing a word fragment completion task. Each word either corresponded exactly to one of the word fragment solutions (target primes) or resembled one of the solutions but was slightly different in its orthographic properties (negative primes). Participants performed most poorly on the items for which they had initially suppressed negative primes.

• The eureka error: inadvertent plagiarism by misattributions of effort.

  Authors: Jesse Preston, Daniel M Wegner

  Journal of personality and social psychology. 05/2007; 92(4):575-84.

  The authors found that the feeling of authorship for mental actions such as solving problems is enhanced by effort cues experienced during mental activity; misattribution of effort cues resulted inThe authors found that the feeling of authorship for mental actions such as solving problems is enhanced by effort cues experienced during mental activity; misattribution of effort cues resulted in inadvertent plagiarism. Pairs of participants took turns solving anagrams as they exerted effort on an unrelated task. People inadvertently plagiarized their partners' answers more often when they experienced high incidental effort while working on the problem and reduced effort as the solution appeared. This result was found for efforts produced when participants squeezed a handgrip during the task (Experiment 1) or when the anagram was displayed in a font that was difficult to read (Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b). Plagiarism declined, however, when participants attended to the source of the effort cues (Experiments 3a and 3b). These results suggest that effort misattribution can influence authorship processing for mental activities.