Publications (2)0 Total impact
Article: On the Equivalence of the Two Existing Extensions of the Leximax criterion to the Infinite Case[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect to the ?nal distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated ?eld of research. In our framework, in order to reach e� ciency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis, we distinguish between permanent and temporary contracts showing the di�erent implication of the two kinds of contracts with respect to the ?nal attribution of individual rights. More precisely, we show that, with temporary binding contracts and under particular assumptions, the ?nal attribution if individual rights does not converge.Departamento de Econom�a - Universidad P�blica de Navarra, Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Econom�a - Universidad P�blica de Navarra. 01/2006;
Article: On the equivalence of the two existing extensions of the leximax criterion to the infinite case[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Using a common framework, we consider the two existing extensions of the leximax criterion to infinite environments [Arlegi, R., Besada, M., Nieto, J., Vázquez, C., 2005. Freedom of choice: the leximax criterion in the infinite case. Mathematical Social Sciences 49, 1–15; Ballester, M., De Miguel, J.R., 2003. Extending an order to the power set: the leximax criterion. Social Choice and Welfare 21, 63–71], and show that, though the respective definitions of the rules and their axiomatic characterizations appear to differ considerably, they actually propose the same extension of the leximax criterion to the infinite case.Mathematical Social Sciences.