Anton Kolotilin

Publications (3)1.02 Total impact

• Article: Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

  Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin, Konstantin Sonin
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  ABSTRACT: In this paper we study nationalizations in the oil industry around the world in 1960-2002. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that governments are more likely to nationalize when oil prices are high and when political institutions are weak. We consider a simple dynamic model of the interaction between a government and a foreign oil company. The government cannot commit to abstain from expropriation and the company cannot commit to pay high taxes. Even though nationalization is inefficient it does occur in equilibrium when oil prices are high. The model's predictions are consistent with the panel analysis of a comprehensive dataset on nationalizations in the oil industry since 1960. Nationalization is more likely to happen when oil prices are high and the quality of institutions is low even when controlling for country fixed effects.
  04/2008;
• Article: Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

  Sergei Guriev, Konstantin Sonin, Anton Kolotilin
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  ABSTRACT: This paper provides a survey on studies that analyze the macroeconomic effects of intellectual property rights (IPR). The first part of this paper introduces different patent policy instruments and reviews their effects on R&D and economic growth. This part also discusses the distortionary effects and distributional consequences of IPR protection as well as empirical evidence on the effects of patent rights. Then, the second part considers the international aspects of IPR protection. In summary, this paper draws the following conclusions from the literature. Firstly, different patent policy instruments have different effects on R&D and growth. Secondly, there is empirical evidence supporting a positive relationship between IPR protection and innovation, but the evidence is stronger for developed countries than for developing countries. Thirdly, the optimal level of IPR protection should tradeoff the social benefits of enhanced innovation against the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. Finally, in an open economy, achieving the globally optimal level of protection requires an international coordination (rather than the harmonization) of IPR protection.
  Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Working Papers. 01/2007;
• Source

  Available from: Konstantin Sonin

  Article: Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

  Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin, Konstantin Sonin
  [show abstract] [hide abstract]
  ABSTRACT: In this article, we study nationalizations in the oil industry around the world during 1960--2006. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that governments are more likely to nationalize when oil prices are high and when political institutions are weak. We consider a simple dynamic model of the interaction between a government and a foreign-owned oil company. Even though nationalization is inefficient, it does occur in equilibrium when oil prices are high. The model's predictions are consistent with the analysis of panel data on nationalizations in the oil industry around the world since 1960. Nationalization is more likely to happen when oil prices are high and the quality of institutions is low, even controlling for country fixed effects. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
  Journal of Law Economics and Organization 27(2):301-323. · 1.02 Impact Factor