[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: When children are presented with an optional shift after learning a discrimination to criterion the proportion of reversal shifts increases and nonselective shifts decrease with age. The present research shows that when albino rats are presented with a similar option the proportion of reversal shifts is practically zero. They make either a nonselective or an extradimensional shift with the former more likely than the latter. A continuity between the behavior of rats and very young children is suggested.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: A developmental study of free-classification behavior within the age range of 3-1/2 to 19 years indicates that categorical responses, which are characteristic of adult behavior, increase with age while overgeneralized responses, classifications including noncategorical instances, decrease with age. Overdiscriminated responses which are incomplete categorical classifications increase from 3-1/2 to 6 years and then decrease to 19 years of age. These results are discussed within a two-stage theory of conceptual development (Kendler, 1971).
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 11/2013; 4(5):456-458. DOI:10.3758/BF03334254
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Nursery school children received either verbal labeling (V), perceptual cue (Q), or control (C) pretraining prior to a reversal shift problem involving sets of cues that differed in terms of brightness (B) or saturation (S). When S was relevant, differences in pretraining had no effect, but, when B was relevant, the V group reversed more rapidly than did the Q and C groups.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: College students were trained to discriminate between sets of either related (R) or unrelated (U) words and were then given a recall test, followed by a recognition test. Results indicated that when equated for the amount of practice, R words were recalled more easily than they were recognized, but recognition was superior to recall for U words. The results are interpreted within a framework that distinguishes between different attributes of words and between storage and retrieval of memory traces.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Replies to comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" (see record
2005-05480-003). Four (see records
2006-03947-013) of the five comments on my article were critical of my treatment of psychology and phenomenology. I will try to identify the sources of these disputes, but not with the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one discipline over the other. In an attempt to compare and contrast psychology and phenomenology, I analyze three concepts: objectivity, values, and falsifiability. Reber's comments (see record
2006-03947-014) were agreeable to read because of the common methodological orientation we share. Reber's optimism about humanity sharing common moral commitments appears to be contradicted by history and current events. Cloonan's (see record
2006-03947-010) plea for a "methodological pluralism" (p. 255) in psychology sounds appealing but is basically destructive for psychology and society. You can't play chess and checkers on the same board at the same time! (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
American Psychologist 03/2006; 61(3):259-261. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.61.3.259 · 6.87 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth.
American Psychologist 05/2005; 60(4):318-24. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.60.4.318 · 6.87 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Tracy S. Kendler's strong desire to get a college education had to overcome economic hardships of the Great Depression and a mother's conviction that finding a suitable husband was more important. Solomon Asch at Brooklyn College, by scholarly example, encouraged her to seek a career in psychology. At the University of Iowa she studied with both Kurt Lewin and Kenneth Spence and finally opted to conduct a research program, ultimately on cognitive development, within a neobehavioristic methodological orientation. Being married to academic psychologist Howard H. Kendler, and a mother of 2 sons, created problems in fashioning an independent academic career, but persistence and research productivity, sometimes a result of collaborative efforts with her husband, finally led to a distinguished career.
History of Psychology 09/2003; 6(3):251-66. DOI:10.1037/1093-4510.6.3.251 · 0.26 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information.
History of Psychology 06/2003; 6(2):203-7. DOI:10.1037/1093-4510.6.2.203 · 0.26 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Comments on the article by R. J. Sternberg and E. L. Grigorenko (see record 2001-10045-001), which described an approach to psychology ("unified psychology") that is a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psychological phenomena through converging operations. According to the present author, Sternberg and Grigorenko ignored fundamental methodological differences within the discipline when they developed their concept of unified psychology. In addition, Sternberg and Grigorenko's conception of a unified psychology was achieved by extending the meanings of converging operations (W. R. Garner et al, 1956) and paradigm (T. S. Kuhn, 1970) beyond their original intent. Sternberg and Grigorenko flagrantly ignored striking differences among contemporary psychologists' criteria for truth or verisimilitude. Instead of viewing psychology within the context of converging operations and paradigms and holding the amorphous conception that psychologists "need adhere to no particular set of methods, to no particular field, and to no particular paradigm," psychologists should consider an alternative, more direct approach: explicitly stating both the nature of the psychological phenomena to be studied and as well as their intended mode of explanation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
American Psychologist 01/2003; 57(12):1125-6. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.57.12.1125 · 6.87 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: The relationship between psychology and ethics is determined by whether psychology is conceptualized as a natural or a human science. If the former, then psychology is incapable of identifying universal moral imperatives because of the fact/value dichotomy that rejects the possibility of logically deriving moral principles or social policies from factual statements. In addition, the inevitability of moral pluralism raises the question as to how natural science methodology can select moral truths or social policies from a variety of presumed alternatives. In contrast, human science psychology, which emphasizes phenomenological experience as a source of psychological truths, has attempted to bridge the fact/value gap. Upon close examination, this approach has failed to suggest a rule as to how the "correct" set of values can be identified. The conclusion is that facts cannot dictate moral principles or social policies but they can help illuminate their consequences. Policy decisions become the responsibility of a democratic society, not of psychology.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Comments on the article by R. E. Redding (see record 2001-00465-001) which discusses pluralism and sociopolitical diversity in psychology. The current author compliments Redding for calling attention to the incongruity between the narrowness of psychology's liberal sociopolitical mentality and its simultaneous reverence for cultural diversity. However, it is stated that Redding's justified criticism fails to come to grips with the moral and methodological issues underlying his complaint. In this comment, the author addresses these issues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
American Psychologist 05/2002; 57(4):297. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.57.4.297a · 6.87 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: An undergraduate assistantship with Abraham Maslow, research with Solomon Asch, and an indirect exposure to Ernest Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged Howard H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with Kenneth Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife Tracy Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism.
History of Psychology 03/2002; 5(1):52-84. DOI:10.1037//1093-4510.5.1.52 · 0.26 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: An undergraduate assistantship with Abraham Maslow, research with Solomon Asch, and an indirect exposure to Ernest Nagel’s philosophy of science encouraged Howard H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with Kenneth Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife Tracy Kendler, in the extension of the Hull–Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism.
History of Psychology 01/2002; 5(1):52-84. DOI:10.1037/1093-4510.5.1.52 · 0.26 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: D. B. Wiseman's (see record
2000-08566-004) claim that Kenneth Spence's human learning research program is an example of a subjective science derives from his misconception of the role of subjectivity in natural-science methodology. Natural science is suffused with subjective ideas, but the major consideration is not their subjectivity but whether they are designed to meet the objective standards of natural-science epistemology or some vague knowledge base that has no predictive validity. Within this context, Kenneth Spence, as his entire career reveals, was actively committed to the ideal that psychology should operate within a natural-science orientation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
History of Psychology 04/2001; 4(2):195-197. DOI:10.1037/1093-4510.4.2.195 · 0.26 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Replies to comments by M. B. Smith (see record 2000-02781-010), K Sheldon et al (see record 2000-02781-011), and J. M. DuBois (see record 2000-02781-012) on H. H. Kendler's (see record 1999-11644-004) article on the role of value in the world of psychology. They incorrectly read into Kendler's position an espousal of a so-called value-free science, a discipline that is free of all values. A major thrust of Kendler's article was not that all of science is value free but instead that scientific data are value neutral; there is no logical connection between the natural is and the moral ought. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
American Psychologist 11/2000; 55(10):1154-5. DOI:10.1037/0003-066X.55.10.1154 · 6.87 Impact Factor
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Comments on the article by B. Beatty (see record 1998-12442-007) which concluded that E. L. Thorndike's educational psychology was the beginning of an American behavioristic tradition that sought efficient, scientific solutions to education, moral, and social problems. The present author poses the question of whether science and psychology can reveal a moral code for humankind, or whether facts are incapable of revealing moral truths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
American Psychologist 04/2000; 55(3):343-4. DOI:10.1037//0003-066X.55.3.343.b · 6.87 Impact Factor