Publications (2)0 Total impact
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ABSTRACT: We explore the extent to which the structure of incentives affects trust. We hypothesize that the degree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via the perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived property rights) will affect individuals’ subsequent behavior. In our experiment, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants engaged in a subsequent trust game in which the sender had access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust in which participants’ relative performance framed trusting behavior.
04/2008;
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ABSTRACT: We explore the extent to which the structure of incentive mechanisms affects individuals' behavior in a trust game. We hypothesize that the de-gree to which different incentive mechanisms emphasize competition (via perceived intentions of others) and entitlements (via the perceived prop-erty rights) will affect individuals' subsequent behavior. In our experi-ments, bargaining pairs earned endowments through either tournaments or team-based incentives. Participants then engaged in a trust game in which the sender has access to the total endowment generated by the pair. We find that the structure of the incentive mechanisms has asymmetric effects on observed trust, in which the relative earnings of the participants framed trusting behavior.
12/2004;
Institutions
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2004
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Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Jena,
Thuringia,
Germany
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The University of Calgary
Calgary,
Alberta,
Canada