Publications (3)0 Total impact
-
[show abstract]
[hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: In this paper we study zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with jumps with the help of theory of Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs). We generalize the results of Fleming and Souganidis [10] and those by Biswas [3] by considering a controlled stochastic system driven by a d-dimensional Brownian motion and a Poisson random measure and by associating nonlinear cost functionals defined by controlled BSDEs. Moreover, unlike the both papers cited above we allow the admissible control processes of both players to depend on all events occurring before the beginning of the game. This quite natural extension allows the players to take into account such earlier events, and it makes even easier to derive the dynamic programming principle. The price to pay is that the cost functionals become random variables and so also the upper and the lower value functions of the game are a priori random fields. The use of a new method allows to prove that, in fact, the upper and the lower value functions are deterministic. On the other hand, the application of BSDE methods [18] allows to prove a dynamic programming principle for the upper and the lower value functions in a very straight-forward way, as well as the fact that they are the unique viscosity solutions of the upper and the lower integral-partial differential equations of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs' type, respectively. Finally, the existence of the value of the game is got in this more general setting if Isaacs' condition holds. Comment: 30 pages.
04/2010;
-
[show abstract]
[hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: In this paper we first investigate zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with reflection with the help of theory of Reflected Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (RBSDEs). We will establish the dynamic programming principle for the upper and the lower value functions of this kind of stochastic differential games with reflection in a straight-forward way. Then the upper and the lower value functions are proved to be the unique viscosity solutions of the associated upper and the lower Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations with obstacles, respectively. The method differs heavily from those used for control problems with reflection, it has its own techniques and its own interest. On the other hand, we also prove a new estimate for RBSDEs being sharper than that in El Karoui, Kapoudjian, Pardoux, Peng and Quenez [7], which turns out to be very useful because it allows to estimate the $L^p$-distance of the solutions of two different RBSDEs by the $p$-th power of the distance of the initial values of the driving forward equations. We also show that the unique viscosity solution of the approximating Isaacs equation which is constructed by the penalization method converges to the viscosity solution of the Isaacs equation with obstacle.
08/2007;
-
[show abstract]
[hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: In this paper we study zero-sum two-player stochastic differential games with
the help of theory of Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs). At
the one hand we generalize the results of the pioneer work of Fleming and
Souganidis by considering cost functionals defined by controlled BSDEs and by
allowing the admissible control processes to depend on events occurring before
the beginning of the game (which implies that the cost functionals become
random variables), on the other hand the application of BSDE methods, in
particular that of the notion of stochastic "backward semigroups" introduced by
Peng allows to prove a dynamic programming principle for the upper and the
lower value functions of the game in a straight-forward way, without passing by
additional approximations. The upper and the lower value functions are proved
to be the unique viscosity solutions of the upper and the lower
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations, respectively. For this Peng's BSDE
method is translated from the framework of stochastic control theory into that
of stochastic differential games.
02/2007;
