Philip Jones

University of Bath, Bath, England, United Kingdom

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Publications (49)38.67 Total impact

  • Lory Barile, John Cullis, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Gneezy et al. (2011) review a literature that assesses the relevance of the form (monetary or non-monetary) of incentives employed to nurture prosocial behaviour. Here the objective is to assess the relevance of characteristics employed to describe individuals when comparing the efficacy of incentives designed to nurture prosocial behaviour. The impact of different incentives depends on the form they take and on the way they are received. This paper compares the impact of different incentives designed to increase pro-environmental behavior (by increasing individuals’ willingness to recycle household waste). Some individuals are more responsive to a nudge (that increases individuals’ perceptions of the intrinsic value of action) than to a threat (that they will be punished if they refuse to comply). The relative efficacy of these incentives depends on the extent to which individuals are motivated by ‘environmental morale’. When designing policy to increase prosocial behavior, ‘one size will not fit all’.
    04/2015; DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2015.04.004
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    ABSTRACT: Government expenditures are procyclical if they increase in periods of economic growth and decrease in periods of economic downturn. This paper tests the proposition that (within federations) political pressures for public expenditure increase the likelihood that expenditures and intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical. An analysis of political pressures in Mexico suggests that political pressures will produce a distinct pattern of procyclical expenditures across fiscal tiers and across government budgets. This prediction is tested with reference to the expenditures of 31 states in Mexico between 2005 and 2010.
    European Journal of Political Economy 12/2014; 37. DOI:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.001 · 1.44 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: When is government expenditure likely to be procyclical? While economists tend to anticipate counter-cyclical expenditure, recent studies report procyclical expenditure. This paper explores the impact of political ideology on the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are tested with reference to government expenditure in the USA between 1950 and 2008. The likelihood of procyclical expenditure increases if groups that press for increased public expenditure are‘…leaning against an open door’.
    Journal of Policy Modeling 10/2014; DOI:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2014.09.003 · 0.64 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: Economic psychology has traditionally focused on tax evasion, neglecting other «public finance» offences such as benefit fraud; the present paper, therefore, aims to perform a first exploratory study on this subject. Questionnaire data collected from a sample of Italian and English students show that, considering an equal economic value, tax evasion and benefit fraud are perceived differently. In particular, participants tend to be more strict with benefit fraud and more lenient with tax evasion; moreover, tax evasion is perceived as a less serious offence compared to other illicit behaviours (including non-fiscal offences). Also, several differences were found comparing two different cultural contexts (Italy and UK). Finally, the article highlights strengths, limitations and future directions of the study.
  • Amal Soliman, Philip Jones, John Cullis
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    ABSTRACT: While neoclassical economic theory sheds insight into the way that audit rates and penalty rates interact when individuals decide to declare income for taxation, it predicts far lower levels of compliance than observed levels of compliance. This paper analyses experimental responses to explore a dynamic interaction between audit and penalty rates as individuals learn how to comply with taxation. It compares the responses of subjects in experiments with responses that are predicted when individuals rely on an adaptive learning process (that offers information feedback about decision payoffs). This comparison suggests that learning is an important consideration when explaining differences between predicted and observed levels of tax compliance.
    Journal of Economic Psychology 02/2014; 40:175–186. DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.012 · 1.21 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Procyclical government spending occurs when government expenditures increase at a faster rate than income in an economic upturn but fall at a faster rate in a recession. Voracity effects occur when competition for increased spending proves more effective as national income increases. Public choice theory can be applied to describe the distribution of fiscal power across different tiers of government to shed insight into competition for intergovernmental transfers. Politicians have electoral incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers but they also have electoral incentives to signal their ability to manage the economy. With this mix of incentives, the prediction is that intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical and that sub-central government spending will be more procyclical than central government spending. Public choice analysis of pressure for increased public spending predicts a specific pattern of cyclical government spending. This pattern can be observed when analyzing government expenditures in 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006. KeywordsBusiness cycles–Fiscal policy–Voracity effects–Volatility
    Public Choice 03/2013; 154(3-4):1-16. DOI:10.1007/s11127-011-9816-9 · 0.91 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Countercyclical government spending offers social protection to the vulnerable when economies move into recession. This paper questions the extent to which governments are able to spend countercyclically and the extent to which social expenditures are likely to be countercyclical. An analysis of public spending in OECD countries (1980-2005) suggests countercyclical social protection is constrained by the limits to public borrowing and the degree of political polarization.
    Economics Letters 12/2012; 117(3):909-911. DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.011 · 0.45 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores the way governments rely on budgets. Budgets are classified with reference to functions (e.g. defence, education, etc.), but expenditure from one budget (e.g. the overseas budget) can prove as effective as expenditure from another budget (e.g. the environment budget) when pursuing a specific policy goal. Are donor countries internalising spillovers by harmonising overseas aid spending with other budgetary expenditures? An empirical analysis of OECD countries (between 1990 and 2005) suggests that they rely systematically on a preferred portfolio of budgets.
    Journal of Policy Modeling 11/2012; 34(6):921–931. DOI:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2012.05.017 · 0.64 Impact Factor
  • John Cullis, Philip Jones, Amal Soliman
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    ABSTRACT: This paper sets out to consider individuals’ motivations to evade taxation. Experimental results indicate that individuals do not simply maximize pecuniary welfare. Their behaviour is consistent with the presence of a ‘spite effect’ when their perceptions are that enforcement variables are ‘excessive’.Highlights► This paper reports two tax evasion experiments conducted with 96 geography students at Cairo University. ► It sheds new insight into individuals’ willingness to comply with taxation when enforcement variables are deemed Draconian. ► More specifically, a ‘spite effect’ is identified when individuals fail to maximise their pecuniary return. ► The results have important implications for the design of tax policy.
    Journal of Socio-Economics 08/2012; 41(4):418-423. DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2011.05.011 · 0.90 Impact Factor
  • Ramses H. Abul Naga, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Developed countries may gain more than developing countries from the provision of a global public good: the greater their valuation of the good, the higher the productivity of developing countries’ contributions and the more developed countries derive satisfaction from altruism.
    Economics Letters 06/2012; 115(3). DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.108 · 0.45 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper tests the predictions that (i) sub-central government expenditures are procyclical and (ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending. The predictions are based on the importance of ‘voracity effects’ and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub-central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure.
    Economics Letters 06/2012; 115(3). DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.104 · 0.45 Impact Factor
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    John Cullis, Philip Jones, Antonio Savoia
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    ABSTRACT: Observed levels of tax compliance are higher than predicted levels (when predictions are based on Allingham and Sandmo’s neoclassical model of tax evasion). They are higher if social norms recognise the importance of compliance. But how do social norms frame decisions to pay tax? Can prospect theory be applied to shed insight into the way that social norms exert their influence? An analysis of questionnaire responses (from Italy and from the UK) suggests that they exert their influence by changing the reference points that individuals use when they code changes as ‘gains’, or ‘losses’. The evidence suggests that social norms frame the decision to pay tax by changing individuals’ perceptions of their entitlement to income. This consideration is important when designing policy to deter evasion.
    Journal of Socio-Economics 12/2011; 41(2). DOI:10.1016/j.socec.2011.12.003 · 0.90 Impact Factor
  • Andrew Abbott, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper tests for differences in the cyclicality of government spending across functional categories. Evidence from 20 OECD countries suggests that procyclicality is more likely in smaller functional budgets, but capital spending is more likely to be procyclical for the larger spending categories.
    Economics Letters 06/2011; 111(3):230-232. DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.02.009 · 0.45 Impact Factor
  • John Cullis, John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: First we would like to thank Christian Bjørnskov for his comments and in particular for acknowledging the contribution we make in introducing the idea that inter-country redistribution might be more effective a way of redistributing incomes than interpersonal redistribution within a country and, in general, the quality of our theoretical and indeed empirical analysis. We feel that the more critical points he makes of the paper are largely due to a misunderstanding and we welcome the opportunity to further clarify our contribution. KeywordsMalevolence–Happiness–Relative income–EU
    Journal of Happiness Studies 04/2011; 12(2):349-351. DOI:10.1007/s10902-010-9189-7 · 1.88 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: Five hundred and five Italian psychology and economics students took part in a tax compliance study testing the influence of detection rates (within subjects) and the between subjects variables of framing effects, instructions to behave instrumentally or not, degree choice and gender. The sample was an improvement on a previous study conducted in the UK where the effects of gender and degree choice were entangled. The results from the Italian sample showed highly significant effects for detection rates, framing effects, gender and degree choice. Participants declared more as detection rates rose and when tax was framed as a gain. Males and economists declared the least. The instruction to maximise income (instrumentality) encouraged psychologists to declare less, while economists behaved instrumentally whether they were asked to or not. The influence of culture was examined by comparing the two data sets. Although the tax systems of these two countries are very similar, tax evasion is much more common in Italy. As anticipated Italian students declared less than UK students and the results for the Italian sample were more pronounced (e.g. the significant framing effect) but otherwise all are in the same direction. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed as the prospects for future empirical studies.
    Journal of Economic Psychology 06/2009; DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2008.11.002 · 1.21 Impact Factor
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    John Cullis, John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper considers the role of redistribution in the light of recent research findings on self reported happiness. The analysis and empirical work reported here tries to relate this to a representative actor ‘homo realitus’ and the ‘pursuit of happiness’ rather than the traditional ‘homo economicus’. Econometrically estimating the determinants of happiness in the European Union (EU) using Eurobarometer data and the construction of an ‘Index of Happiness’ facilitates policy simulations. Such simulations find that in terms of average happiness there is little advantage to redistributing income within a country, but more from redistributing income between countries. The importance for happiness of relative income, average standard of living, marital status and age are confirmed. The theoretical rationale for redistribution is also examined. KeywordsHappiness–Income redistribution–EU
    Journal of Happiness Studies 01/2009; 12(2):323-341. DOI:10.1007/s10902-010-9190-1 · 1.88 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: We analyse the determinants of the number of military personnel, military expenditure and arms imports using a panel data of all available countries with data from 1984-2006. The number of military personnel increases with the extent of external threat and with conscription. There is evidence for both economies of scale and the existence of 'ghost soldiers'. Expenditure, given the number of military personnel, increases with the extent of internal threat and the area of the country. Arms imports increase with the extent of external threat, GDP per capita and corruption. Finally, both arms imports and military expenditure impact upon corruption.
    Defence and Peace Economics 12/2008; 19(6):387-403. DOI:10.1080/10242690801962270 · 0.40 Impact Factor
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    Philip Jones, Peter Dawson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951-2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.
    Scottish Journal of Political Economy 05/2008; 55(2):123-142. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00447.x · 0.21 Impact Factor
  • Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Response to social policy often differs systematically from predictions premised on instrumental motivation. Individuals respond even when they believe that action by one person will make very little difference. But if each individual is motivated by the intrinsic value of action, collectively individuals will make a difference. If policy informs perceptions of the intrinsic value of action should policy be designed to increase willingness to act as a ‘knight’ or ‘good citizen’?
    Social Policy and Society 12/2007; 7(01):27 - 40. DOI:10.1017/S1474746407003983
  • Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. ‘Large’ allies are exploited by ‘small’ allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that ‘exploitation’ increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?
    Public Choice 02/2007; 132(3):319-332. DOI:10.1007/s11127-007-9154-0 · 0.91 Impact Factor