Philip Jones

University of Bath, Bath, England, United Kingdom

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Publications (16)12.29 Total impact

  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: We analyse the determinants of the number of military personnel, military expenditure and arms imports using a panel data of all available countries with data from 1984-2006. The number of military personnel increases with the extent of external threat and with conscription. There is evidence for both economies of scale and the existence of 'ghost soldiers'. Expenditure, given the number of military personnel, increases with the extent of internal threat and the area of the country. Arms imports increase with the extent of external threat, GDP per capita and corruption. Finally, both arms imports and military expenditure impact upon corruption.
    Defence and Peace Economics 01/2008; 19(6):387-403. · 0.40 Impact Factor
  • Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Analysis of international alliances is often premised on predicted responses by nation states when nation states are assumed to behave as utility-maximising actors. ‘Large’ allies are exploited by ‘small’ allies when output is a public good. Empirical analysis of defence expenditures in NATO yields results consistent with the proposition that ‘exploitation’ increases as alliance output approximates a pure public good. But why would large countries acquiesce? A public choice analysis offers a different perspective. If producers of armaments are rent seeking, are large allies able to capture rent by incurring a disproportionate share of defence expenditure?
    Public Choice 02/2007; 132(3):319-332. · 0.91 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
    Journal of Economic Perspectives 02/2005; 19(1):242-243. · 4.21 Impact Factor
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    John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper considers a measure of the “publicness” of goods and services implicit in responses that individuals make when asked about public sector spending. At the limit, all consumers consume equal amounts of a public good. Thus any differences between an individual's self-interest preferences and public-interest preferences cannot be based on differential provision, but only on differences in the individual's public- and self-interest utility functions. If we rule out the latter, self-interest and public-interest preferences for a pure public good are identical. Using sample survey data it is possible to calibrate the public good content of different public goods. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
    Public Choice 01/2005; 124(3):267-282. · 0.91 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Consumers evaluate product quality with information signals such as brand name giving an advantage to established firms over other firms even when introducing a new product. Another signal is 'country of origin' and, as high-income countries focus more heavily on higher quality goods, there is a tendency for consumers to associate quality with a country's income per capita. Thus new firms from developing countries face particular problems in export markets. International standardization offers a potential solution to their problem. However, analysis of the use of ISO 9000 suggests that it is difficult to eliminate the informational asymmetry. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
    Journal of International Development. 02/2003; 15(8):999-1013.
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Standardization reduces uncertainty faced by consumers when choosing products with unknown product quality, which should help those firms without an established brand name in the country of sale and from countries who do not themselves have a reputation for high quality products for the good in question, thus providing a significant boost to international trade. However, if consumers give greater weight to domestic, as opposed to foreign or international, standards, then standards may hinder international trade. We examine empirical evidence which results suggest that British consumers do indeed place considerable weight on British standards, but little on non-British ones.
    Homo Oeconomicus. 01/2003; 20:1-19.
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
    Political Studies 02/2002; 50(3):579-583. · 0.87 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper continues the development of a theoretical foundation for measuring "altruistic" behaviour with respect to tax versus expenditure preferences in three specific spheres: health, education and welfare payments. Particular emphasis is placed on analysing the choice theoretic calculus that underlies individual preferences. Using this theoretical foundation, econometric techniques allow progress to be made in measuring the characteristics of the underlying utility function. The empirical work relates to the UK and confirms that both self-interest and public interest (with a slight emphasis on the latter) determine overall preferences. The implications of this for the public choice school are then examined. Copyright 2002 by Taylor and Francis Group
    Applied Economics 01/2002; 34(3):377-83. · 0.46 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores how consumers combine stochastic signals, hence differentiating it from a game theoretic approach, of product quality from a search theoretic perspective. Individuals will tend to progress towards more cost efficient signals as they get older. Based on this analysis signals are ranked both in terms of cost effectiveness and signal precision.
    Information Economics and Policy 02/2001; 13(1):35-49. · 0.95 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Increasing concern about political ‘sleaze’ prompted the establishment, in 1995, of the Standing Committee of Standards in Public Life and the announcement, in 1999, of proposals to reform political party finance in the UK. A ‘public choice’ analysis predicts ‘opportunism’ by representatives at the expense of ‘rationally ignorant’ voters. It commends constitutional constraints to restrict the range of policy options open to representatives. By contrast, a ‘transactions costs’ approach suggests that electoral competition can offer protection when voters rely on ‘party signal’ as a low cost information source. If voters reduce transactions costs by relying on party signal, politicians have an incentive to maintain party reputation. Representatives are more willing than might otherwise be anticipated to accept the need for regulation if this serves to protect reputation.
    Political Studies 02/2001; 49(1):70-88. · 0.87 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: Electoral turnout cannot be easily explained by reference to instrumental rationality. Instead, turnout depends on consumption gains arising from the act of voting. This paper distinguishes between utility derived from fulfilling a civic duty and utility derived from expressing a political preference. Both considerations affect turnout but a test of the determinants of the decision of whether to vote and the decision of how to vote identifies the importance of perceptions of civic duty. Evidence suggests that intrinsic motivation is important. If so, policy to maintain standards in public life should be framed to "crowd in" intrinsic motivation. Copyright 2000 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
    Kyklos 01/2000; 53(1):3-16. · 0.88 Impact Factor
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
    Public Choice 02/1998; 94(1):175-189. · 0.91 Impact Factor
  • Philip Jones, John Hudson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of electoral participation. Political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate's policies and personal characteristics and, in this way, reduce voters' information costs. With reference to ‘transaction cost economics’, political parties offer an ‘implicit contract’ between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians. This impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties.
    Public Choice 12/1997; 94(1):175-189. · 0.91 Impact Factor
  • Philip Jones, John Hudson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of standardization on welfare of consumers who rely on signals as indicators of product quality. a variance reduction approach suggests that, after standardization, consumers will choose to rely on fewer signals in their evaluation of product quality. the optimal level of standardization is analysed and it is argued that voluntary schemes based on self-interest are unlikely to set this optimum. A test of the proposition that standardization reduces transactions costs is based on a comparison of the number of signals used before and after standardization.
    Homo Oeconomicus. 01/1997; 14:331-346.
  • Philip Jones, John Hudson
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    ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the impact of standardization on the welfare of consumers who rely on signals as indicators of product quality. A variance reduction approach is developed in order to analyse the optimal use of signals in the evaluation of product quality. It is argued that standardization reduces the costs of uncertainty associated with assessing product quality. Cost savings are reflected in the reduction of time and effort which consumers spend on search. Consumers rely on fewer signals in their evaluation of product quality as a consequence of standardization.
    European Journal of Political Economy. 01/1996;
  • John Hudson, Philip Jones
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    ABSTRACT: The realism of the assumption that individuals are motivated purely by self-interest has frequently been called in question but determining to what extent individuals are motivated by a broader collective concern is a difficult exercise. This article considers a technique that estimates the importance of self-interest by using the significance of income as an explanatory variable in an analysis of responses to questionnaire surveys. In particular, it is argued that such an exercise forces the analyst to impose his or her own interpretation of the relationship between income and self-interest. Moreover, inasmuch as altruism has been shown to be a normal good, such arguments tend to ignore the possibility that concern for the “collective good” may itself increase with income. We offer an alternative test, whereby questionnaire respondents themselves deal with this problem and determine the weight that can be given to self-interest and to collective concern.
    Journal of Socio-Economics 02/1994; 23(1-2):101-112.