Véronique Cortier

French National Centre for Scientific Research, Lutetia Parisorum, Île-de-France, France

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Publications (85)9.97 Total impact

  • Vincent Cheval · Véronique Cortier · Eric Le Morvan ·
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    ABSTRACT: It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a practice is indeed secure. We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result, we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.
  • David Bernhard · Véronique Cortier · David Galindo · Olivier Pereira · Bogdan Warinschi ·
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    ABSTRACT: We critically survey game-based security definitions for the privacy of voting schemes. In addition to known limitations, we unveil several previously unnoticed shortcomings. Surprisingly, the conclusion of our study is that none of the existing definitions is satisfactory: they either provide only weak guarantees, or can be applied only to a limited class of schemes, or both. Based on our findings, we propose a new game-based definition of privacy which we call BPRIV. We also identify a new property which we call strong consistency, needed to express that tallying does not leak sensitive information. We validate our security notions by showing that BPRIV, strong consistency (and an additional simple property called strong correctness) for a voting scheme imply its security in a simulation-based sense. This result also yields a proof technique for proving entropy-based notions of privacy which offer the strongest security guarantees but are hard to prove directly: first prove your scheme BPRIV, strongly consistent (and correct), then study the entropy-based privacy of the result function of the election, which is a much easier task.
  • Vincent Cheval · Véronique Cortier ·

  • Véronique Cortier · Fabienne Eigner · Steve Kremer · Matteo Maffei · Cyrille Wiedling ·

  • Steve Kremer · Véronique Cortier ·

    09/2014; 1(3). DOI:10.1561/2500000001
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    Véronique Cortier · David Galindo · Stephane Glondu · Malika Izabachène ·
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    ABSTRACT: Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested.
  • Véronique Cortier ·
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    ABSTRACT: Electronic voting should offer at least the same guarantees than traditional paper-based voting systems. In order to achieve this, electronic voting protocols make use of cryptographic primitives, as in the more traditional case of authentication or key exchange protocols. All these protocols are notoriously difficult to design and flaws may be found years after their first release. Formal models, such as process algebra, Horn clauses, or constraint systems, have been successfully applied to automatically analyze traditional protocols and discover flaws. Electronic voting protocols however significantly increase the difficulty of the analysis task. Indeed, they involve for example new and sophisticated cryptographic primitives, new dedicated security properties, and new execution structures. After an introduction to electronic voting, we describe the current techniques for e-voting protocols analysis and review the key challenges towards a fully automated verification.
  • Hubert Comon-Lundh · Véronique Cortier · Guillaume Scerri ·

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    Rémy Chrétien · Véronique Cortier · Stéphanie Delaune ·
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    ABSTRACT: Privacy properties such as untraceability, vote secrecy, or anonymity are typically expressed as behavioural equivalence in a process algebra that models security protocols. In this paper, we study how to decide one particular relation, namely trace equivalence, for an unbounded number of sessions. Our first main contribution is to reduce the search space for attacks. Specifically, we show that if there is an attack then there is one that is well-typed. Our result holds for a large class of typing systems and a large class of determinate security protocols. Assuming finitely many nonces and keys, we can derive from this result that trace equivalence is decidable for an unbounded number of sessions for a class of tagged protocols, yielding one of the first decidability results for the unbounded case. As an intermediate result, we also provide a novel decision procedure in the case of a bounded number of sessions.
  • Véronique Cortier · David Galindo · Stéphane Glondu · Malika Izabachène ·
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    ABSTRACT: Real-world elections often require threshold cryptosystems so that any t out of l trustees can proceed to tallying. This is needed to protect the confidentiality of the voters' votes against curious authorities (at least t+1 trustees must collude to learn individual votes) as well as to increase the robustness of the election (in case some trustees become unavailable, t+1 trustees suffice to compute the election result). We describe a fully distributed (with no dealer) threshold cryptosystem suitable for the Helios voting system (in particular, suitable to partial decryption), and prove it secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Secondly, we propose a fully distributed variant of Helios, that allows for arbitrary threshold parameters l,t, together with a proof of ballot privacy when used for referendums. Our modification of Helios can be seen as revision of the seminal multi-authority election system from Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers, upon which the original Helios system is based. As such, our work implies, to our knowledge, the first formal proof of ballot privacy for the scheme by Cramer et al. Thirdly, we provide the first open-source implementation of Helios with a fully distributed key generation setup.
    Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society; 11/2013
  • Florian Böhl · Véronique Cortier · Bogdan Warinschi ·
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    ABSTRACT: Most computational soundness theorems deal with a limited number of primitives, thereby limiting their applicability. The notion of deduction soundness of Cortier and Warinschi (CCS'11) aims to facilitate soundness theorems for richer frameworks via composition results: deduction soundness can be extended, generically, with asymmetric encryption and public data structures. Unfortunately, that paper also hints at rather serious limitations regarding further composition results: composability with digital signatures seems to be precluded. In this paper we provide techniques for bypassing the perceived limitations of deduction soundness and demonstrate that it enjoys vastly improved composition properties. More precisely, we show that a deduction sound implementation can be modularly extended with all of the five basic cryptographic primitives (symmetric/asymmetric encryption, message authentication codes, digital signatures, and hash functions). We thus obtain the first soundness framework that allows for the joint use of multiple instances of all of the basic primitives. In addition, we show how to overcome an important restriction of the bare deduction soundness framework which forbids sending encrypted secret keys. In turn, this prevents its use for the analysis of a large class of interesting protocols (e.g.~key exchange protocols). We allow for more liberal uses of keys as long as they are hidden in a sense that we also define. All primitives typically used to send secret data (symmetric/asymmetric encryption) satisfy our requirement which we also show to be preserved under composition.
    Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security; 11/2013
  • Mathilde Arnaud · Véronique Cortier · Cyrille Wiedling ·

  • Vincent Cheval · Véronique Cortier · Antoine Plet ·
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    ABSTRACT: Security protocols have been successfully analyzed using symbolic models, where messages are represented by terms and protocols by processes. Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability are typically expressed as equivalence between processes. While some decision procedures have been proposed for automatically deciding process equivalence, all existing approaches abstract away the information an attacker may get when observing the length of messages. In this paper, we study process equivalence with length tests. We first show that, in the static case, almost all existing decidability results (for static equivalence) can be extended to cope with length tests. In the active case, we prove decidability of trace equivalence with length tests, for a bounded number of sessions and for standard primitives. Our result relies on a previous decidability result from Cheval et al [15] (without length tests). Our procedure has been implemented and we have discovered a new flaw against privacy in the biometric passport protocol.
    Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Aided Verification; 07/2013
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    Rémy Chrétien · Véronique Cortier · Stéphanie Delaune ·
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    ABSTRACT: Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties such as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are very few results for equivalence-based properties, crucial for studying e.g. privacy-like properties such as anonymity or vote secrecy. We study the problem of checking equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Since replication leads very quickly to undecidability (even in the simple case of secrecy), we focus on a limited fragment of protocols (standard primitives but pairs, one variable per protocol's rules) for which the secrecy preservation problem is known to be decidable. Surprisingly, this fragment turns out to be undecidable for equivalence. Then, restricting our attention to deterministic protocols, we propose the first decidability result for checking equivalence of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. This result is obtained through a characterization of equivalence of protocols in terms of equality of languages of (generalized, real-time) deterministic pushdown automata.
    Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II; 07/2013
  • Hubert Comon-Lundh · Véronique Cortier · Guillaume Scerri ·
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    ABSTRACT: The main contribution of the paper is a PTIME decision procedure for the satisfiability problem in a class of first-order Horn clauses. Our result is an extension of the tractable classes of Horn clauses of Basin & Ganzinger in several respects. For instance, our clauses may contain atomic formulas S⊢t where ⊢ is a predicate symbol and S is a finite set of terms instead of a term. ⊢ is used to represent any possible computation of an attacker, given a set of messages S. The class of clauses that we consider encompasses the clauses designed by Bana & Comon-Lundh for security proofs of protocols in a computational model. Because of the (variadic) ⊢ predicate symbol, we cannot use ordered resolution strategies only, as in Basin & Ganzinger: given S⊢t, we must avoid computing S′⊢t for all subsets S′ of S. Instead, we design PTIME entailment procedures for increasingly expressive fragments, such procedures being used as oracles for the next fragment. Finally, we obtain a PTIME procedure for arbitrary ground clauses and saturated Horn clauses (as in Basin & Ganzinger), together with a particular class of (non saturated) Horn clauses with the ⊢ predicate and constraints (which are necessary to cover the application).
    Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Automated Deduction; 06/2013
  • Vincent Cheval · Véronique Cortier · Stéphanie Delaune ·
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    ABSTRACT: Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing results focus on trace properties like secrecy or authentication. There are however several security properties, which cannot be defined (or cannot be naturally defined) as trace properties and require a notion of behavioral equivalence. Typical examples are anonymity, privacy related properties or statements closer to security properties used in cryptography.In this paper, we consider three notions of equivalence defined in the applied pi calculus: observational equivalence, may-testing equivalence, and trace equivalence. First, we study the relationship between these three notions. We show that for determinate processes, observational equivalence actually coincides with trace equivalence, a notion simpler to reason with. We exhibit a large class of determinate processes, called simple processes, that capture most existing protocols and cryptographic primitives. While trace equivalence and may-testing equivalence seem very similar, we show that may-testing equivalence is actually strictly stronger than trace equivalence. We prove that the two notions coincide for image-finite processes, such as processes without replication.Second, we reduce the decidability of trace equivalence (for finite processes) to deciding symbolic equivalence between sets of constraint systems. For simple processes without replication and with trivial else branches, it turns out that it is actually sufficient to decide symbolic equivalence between pairs of positive constraint systems. Thanks to this reduction and relying on a result first proved by M. Baudet, this yields the first decidability result of observational equivalence for a general class of equational theories (for processes without else branch nor replication). Moreover, based on another decidability result for deciding equivalence between sets of constraint systems, we get decidability of trace equivalence for processes with else branch for standard primitives.
    Theoretical Computer Science 06/2013; 492:1–39. DOI:10.1016/j.tcs.2013.04.016 · 0.66 Impact Factor
  • Myrto Arapinis · Véronique Cortier · Steve Kremer · Mark D. Ryan ·
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    ABSTRACT: Will my vote remain secret in 20 years? This is a natural question in the context of electronic voting, where encrypted votes may be published on a bulletin board for verifiability purposes, but the strength of the encryption is eroded with the passage of time. The question has been addressed through a property referred to as everlasting privacy. Perfect everlasting privacy may be difficult or even impossible to achieve, in particular in remote electronic elections. In this paper, we propose a definition of practical everlasting privacy. The key idea is that in the future, an attacker will be more powerful in terms of computation (he may be able to break the cryptography) but less powerful in terms of the data he can operate on (transactions between a vote client and the vote server may not have been stored). We formalize our definition of everlasting privacy in the applied-pi calculus. We provide the means to characterize what an attacker can break in the future in several cases. In particular, we model this for perfectly hiding and computationally binding primitives (or the converse), such as Pedersen commitments, and for symmetric and asymmetric encryption primitives. We adapt existing tools, in order to allow us to automatically prove everlasting privacy. As an illustration, we show that several variants of Helios (including Helios with Pedersen commitments) and a protocol by Moran and Naor achieve practical everlasting privacy, using the ProVerif and the AKiSs tools.
    Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust; 03/2013
  • Véronique Cortier · David Galindo · Stephane Glondu · Malika Izabachène ·
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    ABSTRACT: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/177
  • Mathieu Baudet · Véronique Cortier · Stéphanie Delaune ·

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    Véronique Cortier · Graham Steel · Cyrille Wiedling ·
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    ABSTRACT: While extensive research addresses the problem of establishing session keys through cryptographic protocols, relatively little work has appeared addressing the problem of revocation and update of long term keys. We present an API for symmetric key management on embedded devices that supports key establishment and revocation, and prove security properties of our design in the symbolic model of cryptography. Our API supports two modes of revocation: a passive mode where keys have an expiration time, and an active mode where revocation messages are sent to devices. For the first we show that once enough time has elapsed after the compromise of a key, the system returns to a secure state, i.e. the API is robust against attempts by the attacker to use a compromised key to compromise other keys or to keep the compromised key alive past its validity time. For the second we show that once revocation messages have been received the system immediately returns to a secure state. Notable features of our designs are that all secret values on the device are revocable, and the device returns to a functionally equivalent state after revocation is complete.
    Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security; 10/2012

Publication Stats

2k Citations
9.97 Total Impact Points


  • 2003-2013
    • French National Centre for Scientific Research
      • Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification (LSV)
      Lutetia Parisorum, Île-de-France, France
  • 2011
    • National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control
      Le Chesney, Île-de-France, France
  • 2005
    • Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et Ses Applications
      Villers, Lorraine, France
  • 1999-2002
    • Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan
      • Laboratoire spécification et vérification (LSV)
      Cachon, Île-de-France, France