Véronique Cortier

French National Centre for Scientific Research, Lutetia Parisorum, Île-de-France, France

Are you Véronique Cortier?

Claim your profile

Publications (69)1.42 Total impact

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Real-world elections often require threshold cryptosystems so that any t out of l trustees can proceed to tallying. This is needed to protect the confidentiality of the voters' votes against curious authorities (at least t+1 trustees must collude to learn individual votes) as well as to increase the robustness of the election (in case some trustees become unavailable, t+1 trustees suffice to compute the election result). We describe a fully distributed (with no dealer) threshold cryptosystem suitable for the Helios voting system (in particular, suitable to partial decryption), and prove it secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Secondly, we propose a fully distributed variant of Helios, that allows for arbitrary threshold parameters l,t, together with a proof of ballot privacy when used for referendums. Our modification of Helios can be seen as revision of the seminal multi-authority election system from Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers, upon which the original Helios system is based. As such, our work implies, to our knowledge, the first formal proof of ballot privacy for the scheme by Cramer et al. Thirdly, we provide the first open-source implementation of Helios with a fully distributed key generation setup.
    Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society; 11/2013
  • Florian Böhl, Véronique Cortier, Bogdan Warinschi
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Most computational soundness theorems deal with a limited number of primitives, thereby limiting their applicability. The notion of deduction soundness of Cortier and Warinschi (CCS'11) aims to facilitate soundness theorems for richer frameworks via composition results: deduction soundness can be extended, generically, with asymmetric encryption and public data structures. Unfortunately, that paper also hints at rather serious limitations regarding further composition results: composability with digital signatures seems to be precluded. In this paper we provide techniques for bypassing the perceived limitations of deduction soundness and demonstrate that it enjoys vastly improved composition properties. More precisely, we show that a deduction sound implementation can be modularly extended with all of the five basic cryptographic primitives (symmetric/asymmetric encryption, message authentication codes, digital signatures, and hash functions). We thus obtain the first soundness framework that allows for the joint use of multiple instances of all of the basic primitives. In addition, we show how to overcome an important restriction of the bare deduction soundness framework which forbids sending encrypted secret keys. In turn, this prevents its use for the analysis of a large class of interesting protocols (e.g.~key exchange protocols). We allow for more liberal uses of keys as long as they are hidden in a sense that we also define. All primitives typically used to send secret data (symmetric/asymmetric encryption) satisfy our requirement which we also show to be preserved under composition.
    Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security; 11/2013
  • Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, Antoine Plet
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Security protocols have been successfully analyzed using symbolic models, where messages are represented by terms and protocols by processes. Privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability are typically expressed as equivalence between processes. While some decision procedures have been proposed for automatically deciding process equivalence, all existing approaches abstract away the information an attacker may get when observing the length of messages. In this paper, we study process equivalence with length tests. We first show that, in the static case, almost all existing decidability results (for static equivalence) can be extended to cope with length tests. In the active case, we prove decidability of trace equivalence with length tests, for a bounded number of sessions and for standard primitives. Our result relies on a previous decidability result from Cheval et al [15] (without length tests). Our procedure has been implemented and we have discovered a new flaw against privacy in the biometric passport protocol.
    Proceedings of the 25th international conference on Computer Aided Verification; 07/2013
  • Rémy Chrétien, Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reachability properties such as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are very few results for equivalence-based properties, crucial for studying e.g. privacy-like properties such as anonymity or vote secrecy. We study the problem of checking equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Since replication leads very quickly to undecidability (even in the simple case of secrecy), we focus on a limited fragment of protocols (standard primitives but pairs, one variable per protocol's rules) for which the secrecy preservation problem is known to be decidable. Surprisingly, this fragment turns out to be undecidable for equivalence. Then, restricting our attention to deterministic protocols, we propose the first decidability result for checking equivalence of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. This result is obtained through a characterization of equivalence of protocols in terms of equality of languages of (generalized, real-time) deterministic pushdown automata.
    Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II; 07/2013
  • Hubert Comon-Lundh, Véronique Cortier, Guillaume Scerri
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The main contribution of the paper is a PTIME decision procedure for the satisfiability problem in a class of first-order Horn clauses. Our result is an extension of the tractable classes of Horn clauses of Basin & Ganzinger in several respects. For instance, our clauses may contain atomic formulas S⊢t where ⊢ is a predicate symbol and S is a finite set of terms instead of a term. ⊢ is used to represent any possible computation of an attacker, given a set of messages S. The class of clauses that we consider encompasses the clauses designed by Bana & Comon-Lundh for security proofs of protocols in a computational model. Because of the (variadic) ⊢ predicate symbol, we cannot use ordered resolution strategies only, as in Basin & Ganzinger: given S⊢t, we must avoid computing S′⊢t for all subsets S′ of S. Instead, we design PTIME entailment procedures for increasingly expressive fragments, such procedures being used as oracles for the next fragment. Finally, we obtain a PTIME procedure for arbitrary ground clauses and saturated Horn clauses (as in Basin & Ganzinger), together with a particular class of (non saturated) Horn clauses with the ⊢ predicate and constraints (which are necessary to cover the application).
    Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Automated Deduction; 06/2013
  • Myrto Arapinis, Véronique Cortier, Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Will my vote remain secret in 20 years? This is a natural question in the context of electronic voting, where encrypted votes may be published on a bulletin board for verifiability purposes, but the strength of the encryption is eroded with the passage of time. The question has been addressed through a property referred to as everlasting privacy. Perfect everlasting privacy may be difficult or even impossible to achieve, in particular in remote electronic elections. In this paper, we propose a definition of practical everlasting privacy. The key idea is that in the future, an attacker will be more powerful in terms of computation (he may be able to break the cryptography) but less powerful in terms of the data he can operate on (transactions between a vote client and the vote server may not have been stored). We formalize our definition of everlasting privacy in the applied-pi calculus. We provide the means to characterize what an attacker can break in the future in several cases. In particular, we model this for perfectly hiding and computationally binding primitives (or the converse), such as Pedersen commitments, and for symmetric and asymmetric encryption primitives. We adapt existing tools, in order to allow us to automatically prove everlasting privacy. As an illustration, we show that several variants of Helios (including Helios with Pedersen commitments) and a protocol by Moran and Naor achieve practical everlasting privacy, using the ProVerif and the AKiSs tools.
    Proceedings of the Second international conference on Principles of Security and Trust; 03/2013
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We propose a new measure for privacy of votes. Our measure relies on computational conditional entropy, an extension of the traditional notion of entropy that incorporates both information-theoretic and computational aspects. As a result, we capture in a unified manner privacy breaches due to two orthogonal sources of insecurity: combinatorial aspects that have to do with the number of participants, the distribution of their votes and published election outcome as well as insecurity of the cryptography used in an implementation. Our privacy measure overcomes limitations of two previous approaches to defining vote privacy and we illustrate its applicability through several case studies. We offer a generic way of applying our measure to a large class of cryptographic protocols that includes the protocols implemented in Helios. We also describe a practical application of our metric on Scantegrity audit data from a real election.
    Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security; 10/2012
  • Véronique Cortier, Graham Steel, Cyrille Wiedling
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: While extensive research addresses the problem of establishing session keys through cryptographic protocols, relatively little work has appeared addressing the problem of revocation and update of long term keys. We present an API for symmetric key management on embedded devices that supports key establishment and revocation, and prove security properties of our design in the symbolic model of cryptography. Our API supports two modes of revocation: a passive mode where keys have an expiration time, and an active mode where revocation messages are sent to devices. For the first we show that once enough time has elapsed after the compromise of a key, the system returns to a secure state, i.e. the API is robust against attempts by the attacker to use a compromised key to compromise other keys or to keep the compromised key alive past its validity time. For the second we show that once revocation messages have been received the system immediately returns to a secure state. Notable features of our designs are that all secret values on the device are revocable, and the device returns to a functionally equivalent state after revocation is complete.
    Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security; 10/2012
  • Véronique Cortier, Jan Degrieck, Stéphanie Delaune
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Routing protocols aim at establishing a route between nodes on a network. Secured versions of routing protocols have been proposed in order to provide more guarantees on the resulting routes. Formal methods have proved their usefulness when analysing standard security protocols such as confidentiality or authentication protocols. However, existing results and tools do not apply to routing protocols. This is due in particular to the fact that all possible topologies (infinitely many) have to be considered. In this paper, we propose a simple reduction result: when looking for attacks on properties such as the validity of the route, it is sufficient to consider topologies with only four nodes, resulting in a number of just five distinct topologies to consider. As an application, we analyse the SRP applied to DSR and the SDMSR protocols using the ProVerif tool.
    Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust; 03/2012
  • Véronique Cortier, Cyrille Wiedling
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties. In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, considering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.
    Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust; 03/2012
  • Source
    Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic functions (encryption, exclusive or, . . . ). The analysis of cryptographic protocols requires a precise understanding of the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are usually considered: deducibility and indistinguishability. Those notions are well-studied and several decidability results already exist to deal with a variety of equational theories. Most of the existing results are dedicated to specific equational theories and only few results, especially in the case of indistinguishability, have been obtained for equational theories with associative and commutative properties (AC). In this paper, we show that existing decidability results can be easily combined for any disjoint equational theories: if the deducibility and indistinguishability relations are decidable for two disjoint theories, they are also decidable for their union. We also propose a general setting for solving deducibility and indistinguishability for an important class (called monoidal ) of equational theories involving AC operators. As a consequence of these two results, new decidability and complexity results can be obtained for many relevant equational theories.
    Journal of Automated Reasoning 01/2012; · 0.57 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Hubert Comon-Lundh, Véronique Cortier, Guillaume Scerri
    IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive. 01/2012; 2012:8.
  • Source
    Véronique Cortier, Steve Kremer, Bogdan Warinschi
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the approaches relies on a computational model that considers issues of complexity and probability. This approach captures a strong notion of security, guaranteed against all probabilistic polynomial-time attacks. The other approach relies on a symbolic model of protocol executions in which cryptographic primitives are treated as black boxes. Since the seminal work of Dolev and Yao, it has been realized that this latter approach enables significantly simpler and often automated proofs. However, the guarantees that it offers have been quite unclear. For more than twenty years the two approaches have coexisted but evolved mostly independently. Recently, significant research efforts attempt to develop paradigms for cryptographic systems analysis that combines the best of both worlds. There are two broad directions that have been followed. {\em Computational soundness} aims to establish sufficient conditions under which results obtained using symbolic models imply security under computational models. The {\em direct approach} aims to apply the principles and the techniques developed in the context of symbolic models directly to computational ones. In this paper we survey existing results along both of these directions. Our goal is to provide a rather complete summary that could act as a quick reference for researchers who want to contribute to the field, want to make use of existing results, or just want to get a better picture of what results already exist.
    Journal of Automated Reasoning 04/2011; · 0.57 Impact Factor
  • Source
    Mouhebeddine Berrima, Narjes Ben Rajeb, Véronique Cortier
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.
    01/2011;
  • Source
    Véronique Cortier, Ben Smyth
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and this magnification can be used to violated privacy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attack by violating a voter's privacy in a mock election using the software implementation of Helios. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy. We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus. Furthermore, we present similar vulnerabilities in other electronic voting protocols --namely, the schemes by Lee et al., Sako and Kilian and Schoenmakers --which do not assure ballot independence. Finally, we argue that independence and privacy properties are unrelated, and non-malleability is stronger than independence.
    Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2011, Cernay-la-Ville, France, 27-29 June, 2011; 01/2011
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We review a postal voting system used in spring 2011 by the French research institute CNRS and designed by a French company (Tagg Informatique). We explain how the structure of the material can be easily understood out of a few samples of voting material (distributed to the voters), without any prior knowledge of the system. Taking advantage of some flaws in the design of the system, we show how to perform major ballot stuffing, making possible to change the outcome of the election. Our attack has been tested and confirmed by the CNRS. A fixed postal voting system has been quickly proposed by Tagg Informatique in collaboration with the CNRS, preventing this attack for the next elections.
    2011 International Workshop on Requirements Engineering for Electronic Voting Systems, REVOTE 2011, Trento, Italy, August 29, 2011; 01/2011
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Recent results show that the current implementation of Helios, a practical e-voting protocol, does not ensure independence of the cast votes, and demonstrate the impact of this lack of independence on vote privacy. Some simple fixes seem to be available and security of the revised scheme has been studied with respect to symbolic models. In this paper we study the security of Helios using computational models. Our first contribution is a model for the property known as ballot privacy that generalizes and extends several existing ones. Using this model, we investigate an abstract voting scheme (of which the revised Helios is an instantiation) built from an arbitrary encryption scheme with certain functional properties. We prove, generically, that whenever this encryption scheme falls in the class of voting-friendly schemes that we define, the resulting voting scheme provably satisfies ballot privacy. We explain how our general result yields cryptographic security guarantees for the revised version of Helios (albeit from non-standard assumptions). Furthermore, we show (by giving two distinct constructions) that it is possible to construct voting-friendly encryption, and therefore voting schemes, using only standard cryptographic tools. We detail an instantiation based on ElGamal encryption and Fiat-Shamir noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs that closely resembles Helios and which provably satisfies ballot privacy.
    Computer Security - ESORICS 2011 - 16th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Leuven, Belgium, September 12-14, 2011. Proceedings; 01/2011
  • Hubert Comon-Lundh, Véronique Cortier
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Their design is known to be error-prone with flaws found years later. That is why they deserve a careful security analysis, with rigorous proofs. Two main lines of research have been (independently) developed to analyse the security of protocols. On the one hand, formal methods provide with symbolic models and often automatic proofs. On the other hand, cryptographic models propose a tighter modeling but proofs are more difficult to write and to check. An approach developed during the last decade consists in bridging the two approaches, showing that symbolic models are \emph{sound} w.r.t. symbolic ones, yielding strong security guarantees using automatic tools. These results have been developed for several cryptographic primitives (e.g. symmetric and asymmetric encryption, signatures, hash) and security properties. While proving soundness of symbolic models is a very promising approach, several technical details are often not satisfactory. Focusing on symmetric encryption, we describe the difficulties and limitations of the available results.
    Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS2011). 01/2011;
  • Source
    Mathilde Arnaud, Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Security protocols aim at securing communications over public networks. Their design is notoriously difficult and error-prone. Formal methods have shown their usefulness for providing a careful security analysis in the case of standard authentication and confidentiality protocols. However, most current techniques do not apply to protocols that perform recursive computation e.g. on a list of messages received from the network. While considering general recursive input/output actions very quickly yields undecidability, we focus on protocols that perform recursive tests on received messages but output messages that depend on the inputs in a standard way. This is in particular the case of secured routing protocols, distributed right delegation or PKI certification paths. We provide NPTIME decision procedures for protocols with recursive tests and for a bounded number of sessions. We also revisit constraint system solving, providing a complete symbolic representation of the attacker knowledge.
    Automated Deduction - CADE-23 - 23rd International Conference on Automated Deduction, Wroclaw, Poland, July 31 - August 5, 2011. Proceedings; 01/2011
  • Véronique Cortier
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Security protocols are small distributed programs that are designed to ensure security over untrusted networks such as the Internet. They are notoriously dificult to design and flaws can be found several years after their publication and even their deployment. In particular, they are not securely composable in general: two protocols may be secure when analyzed separately but may cause harmful interactions to each other. We explore how tagging protocols allows to securely compose protocols.
    Theory of Security and Applications - Joint Workshop, TOSCA 2011, Saarbrücken, Germany, March 31 - April 1, 2011, Revised Selected Papers; 01/2011

Publication Stats

1k Citations
1.42 Total Impact Points

Institutions

  • 2003–2013
    • French National Centre for Scientific Research
      • Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification (LSV)
      Lutetia Parisorum, Île-de-France, France
  • 2005–2006
    • University of California, Santa Cruz
      • Department of Computer Science
      Santa Cruz, CA, United States
    • Stanford University
      Palo Alto, California, United States
  • 2001–2003
    • Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan
      • Laboratoire spécification et vérification (LSV)
      Cachon, Île-de-France, France