Charalambos G. Tsangarides

International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C., DC, USA

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Publications (8)0 Total impact

  • Source
    Article: Shifting Motives: Explaining the Buildup in Official Reserves in Emerging Markets Since the 1980s
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Atish R. Ghosh, Jonathan David Ostry
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    ABSTRACT: Why have emerging market economies (EMEs) been stockpiling international reserves? We find that motives have varied over time—vulnerability to current account shocks was relatively important in the 1980s but, as EMEs have become more financially integrated, factors related to the magnitude of potential capital outflows have gained in importance. Reserve accumulation as a by-product of undervalued currencies has also become more important since the Asian crisis. Correspondingly, using quantile regressions, we find that the reason for holding reserves varies according to the country’s position in the global reserves distribution. High reserve holders, who tend to be more financially integrated, are motivated by insurance against capital account rather than current account shocks, and are more sensitive to the cost of holding reserves than are low-reserve holders. Currency undervaluation is a significant determinant across the reserves distribution, albeit for different reasons.
    International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research Paper Series. 02/2012;
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    Article: Words vs. Deeds: What Really Matters?
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Mahvash Saeed Qureshi, Atish R. Ghosh
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    ABSTRACT: This paper revisits the link between the nominal exchange rate regime and inflation, based on a sample of 145 emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) over the period 1980-2010. We contend that, just as a de jure peg that is not backed by a de facto peg will have little value, de facto pegs that lack the corresponding de jure will likewise reap few of the low inflation benefits associated with pegging the exchange rate. To test our hypothesis, we exploit a novel dataset of both de jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications. We find that pegged exchange rates are associated with significantly lower inflation in EMDCs than flexible exchange rates, and that this effect is much stronger for de facto pegs that are matched by de jure pegs than for those that are not. When it comes to anchoring expectations and delivering low inflation, therefore, both deeds and words matter.
    Monetary Economics eJournal. 05/2011;
  • Article: The Empirics of Exchange Rate Regimes and Trade: Words vs. Deeds
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Mahvash Saeed Qureshi
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    ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of exchange rate regimes on bilateral trade while differentiating the effects of "words" and "deeds". Our findings-based on an extended database for de jure and de facto exchange rate classifications-show that while fixed exchange rate regimes increase trade, there is no systematic difference in the effects of policy announcements versus actions to maintain exchange rate stability. The trade generating effect of more stable exchange rate regimes is however more pronounced when words and actions are aligned, both in the short and long-run. Policy credibility therefore plays an important role in determining the effects of de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements such that deviations between the two could be costly. In addition, we find evidence that (i) the impact of hard pegs such as currency unions is broadly similar to that of conventional pegs; (ii) the currency union and direct peg effects evolve over time; and (iii) the effects of more stable regimes are heterogeneous across country groups.
    International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers. 01/2010;
  • Source
    Article: Exchange Rate Regimes and Trade: Is Africa Different?
    Mahvash Saeed Qureshi, Charalambos G Tsangarides
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    ABSTRACT: This paper revisits the link between exchange rate regimes and trade in the context of Africa's exchange rate arrangements. Using an augmented gravity model that includes measures of currency unions as well as direct and indirect fixed exchange rates, the paper benchmarks Africa's experience with that of the rest of world. Our results suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes in the form of currency unions or direct pegs promote trade in Africa: the effect of currency unions and direct fixed exchange rates on Africa's bilateral trade is almost double than that for an average country in the world sample. In addition, we find that the effect of currency unions depends more on the geographical proximity of the trading partners in Africa than in the world, with member countries closer to each other reaping more trade gains. Finally, currency unions make trade more stable in Africa and affect the volume of trade through channels other than reduced exchange rate volatility.
    04/2009;
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    Article: Monetary Union Membership in West Africa: A Cluster Analysis
    Mahvash Saeed Qureshi, Charalambos G. Tsangarides
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    ABSTRACT: Summary Applying hard and soft clustering algorithms to a set of variables suggested by the convergence criteria and the theory of optimal currency areas, this paper examines the suitability of countries in the west African region to form the proposed monetary unions, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Our analysis reveals considerable dissimilarities in the economic characteristics of member countries, particularly WAMZ countries. Furthermore, when west and central African countries are considered together, we find significant heterogeneities within the CFA franc zone, and some interesting similarities between the central African and WAMZ countries.
    World Development. 01/2008; 36(7):1261-1279.
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    Article: Trade Reform in the CEMAC: Developments and Opportunities
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Jan Kees Martijn
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    ABSTRACT: This paper compares different nominal anchors in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime for the future single regional currency of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). We study the anchor choice when the countries focus the exchange rate policy to promote internal and external competitiveness. We consider four foreign anchor currencies: the us dollar, the euro, the yen and the yuan. Using a counterfactual analysis, we find little support for a dominant peg in the ECOWAS zone. In attempting to select an anchor currency, as regards internal and external competitiveness, several aspects need to be taken into consideration: the variability of the commodity prices, adverse downward trend movements, the stability of export revenues and the invoicing currency. A discriminating element is the direction toward which the anchor currency moves, while the world price of commodities evolves in the opposite direction. Our simulations show that the countries would not agree on the same anchor if they pursue several goals: maximizing the export revenues, minimizing their variability, stabilizing them and minimizing the real exchange rate misalignments from its fundamental value.
    International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers. 01/2007;
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    Article: Stylized Facts on Bilateral Trade and Currency Unions: Implications for Africa
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Pierre Ewenczyk, Michal Hulej
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    ABSTRACT: This paper explores and quantifies several aspects of the performance of currency unions using an augmented version of the gravity model and focusing on two samples, the world and Africa. Our empirical findings suggest that, in principle, membership in a currency union should benefit Africa as much as it does the rest of the world. In addition, we find evidence from both samples that the effect of currency unions on trade is large, almost a doubling; currency unions are associated with trade creation, increase price co-movements among members, and make trade more stable; and longer duration of currency union membership brings about more benefits, although with some diminishing returns.
    03/2006;
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    Article: What is Fuzzy About Clustering in West Africa?
    Charalambos G. Tsangarides, Mahvash Saeed Qureshi
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    ABSTRACT: This paper compares different nominal anchors in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime for the future single regional currency of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). We study the anchor choice when the countries focus the exchange rate policy to promote internal and external competitiveness. We consider four foreign anchor currencies: the us dollar, the euro, the yen and the yuan. Using a counterfactual analysis, we find little support for a dominant peg in the ECOWAS zone. In attempting to select an anchor currency, as regards internal and external competitiveness, several aspects need to be taken into consideration: the variability of the commodity prices, adverse downward trend movements, the stability of export revenues and the invoicing currency. A discriminating element is the direction toward which the anchor currency moves, while the world price of commodities evolves in the opposite direction. Our simulations show that the countries would not agree on the same anchor if they pursue several goals: maximizing the export revenues, minimizing their variability, stabilizing them and minimizing the real exchange rate misalignments from its fundamental value.
    International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers. 01/2006;

Institutions

  • 2008–2012
    • International Monetary Fund
      Washington, D. C., DC, USA
    • University of Cambridge
      Cambridge, ENG, United Kingdom