Li Qin

Publications (4)0 Total impact

• Source

  Available from: beta-umr7522.fr

  Article: Robust Monetary Policy under Model Uncertainty and Inflation Persistence

  Li Qin, Mo�se Sidiropoulos, Eleftherios Spyromitros
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  ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relationship between the preference for ro- bustness of central bank (when it fears that its model is misspecified), the inflation persistence and the output cost of disinflation. Using a simple monetary game model in which higher preference for robustness of central bank is positively associated with the inflation persistence and thus nega- tively with the speed of disinflation, this paper shows that the output cost of disinflation is higher when the less the central bank believes that its reference model is robust.
  Bureau d'Economie Th�orique et Appliqu�e, UDS, Strasbourg, Working Papers of BETA. 01/2009;
• Source

  Available from: u-strasbg.fr

  Article: Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences for Robustness.

  Li Qin, Eleftherios Spyromitros, Moïse Sidiropoulos
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  ABSTRACT: In this paper,we consider the transparency of monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with misspecification doubts. Model uncertainty allows us to identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to a lack of information about central bank’s preference for model robustness. Thus, taking into account this lack of transparency, we study its impacts on macroeconomic variables. We show that greater transparency can reduce the variability of output gap, inflation as well as that of their expected values.
  02/2007;
• Source

  Available from: u-strasbg.fr

  Article: Does Model Uncertainty Lead to Less Central Bank Transparency?

  Li Qin, Elefterios Spyromitros, Moïse Sidiropoulos
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  ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the problem of monetary policy transparency in a simple static robust control framework. In this framework, we identify two sources of monetary policy uncertainty. First, we identify the uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation stabilization preferences, which affects the private sector’s inflation expectations and therefore the realized inflation and output. On the other hand, uncertainty means that central bank is unsure about its model, in the sense that there is a group of approximate models that it also considers as possibly true and its objective is to choose a rule that will work under a range of different model specifications. We find that robustness reveals the emergence of a precautionary behaviour of the central bank in the case of unstructured model uncertainty, reducing thus central bank’s willingness to choice a high degree of monetary policy transparency.
  02/2006;
• Source

  Available from: SSRN

  Article: ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

  Li Qin, Eleftherios Spyromitros, Moïse Sidiropoulos
  Bulletin of Economic Research. 62(2):197-208.