Grigorieva Elena

Maastricht University, Maestricht, Limburg, Netherlands

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Publications (3)0 Total impact

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    ABSTRACT: We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result applies to the general class of bisection auctions. In contrast we show that, when we allow for inefficient allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more specific, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate efficiency in equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 02/2006;
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    ABSTRACT: In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the e±ciency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the parameter c of the auction we can trade o® e±ciency against running time. Moreover, we show that the auction that gives the desired level of e±ciency in expectation takes the same number of rounds for any number of players.
    02/2006;
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    Grigorieva Elena, Strobel Martin
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    ABSTRACT: We present a laboratory experiment in which we investigate bidding behavior with independent private values in the recently proposed bisection auction, and compare it with two classical auction formats - the Vickrey auction and the English auction. We test whether subjects behave strategically equivalent, following the dominant truth-telling strategy, as predicted by theory. Furthermore, we provide some insights concerning the learning process, the efficiency of allocation, and the revenue to the auctioneer. Data show that the bisection auction performs better than the Vickrey auction and only in some terms worse than the English auction.
    02/2006;