Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publications (2)0 Total impact

• Source

  Available from: Georg Kirchsteiger

  Article: On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

  Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Georg Kirchsteiger, Markus Walzl
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  ABSTRACT: We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market - clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are competing, we find that traders learn to select non-market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market-clearing level, provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer. This in turn leads market designers to introduce non-market clearing platforms. Hence platform competition induces non-competitive market outcomes.
  02/2007;
• Article: Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?

  Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Georg Kirchsteiger
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  ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, in the long run traders may fail to coordinate exclusively in market clearing institutions.
  01/2004;