Publications (3)0 Total impact
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Article: A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
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ABSTRACT: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with a non-negligible probability for any election rule among three alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship and from having only two alternatives in its range.05/2011; -
Article: Elections Can be Manipulated Often
05/2008; -
Article: Boolean functions whose Fourier transform is concentrated on the first two levels
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ABSTRACT: In this note we describe Boolean functions f(x1,x2,…,xn) whose Fourier coefficients are concentrated on the lowest two levels. We show that such a function is close to a constant function or to a function of the form f=xk or f=1−xk. This result implies a “stability” version of a classical discrete isoperimetric result and has an application in the study of neutral social choice functions. The proofs touch on interesting harmonic analysis issues.Advances in Applied Mathematics.