Illusion of sense of self-agency: Discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency, but not the sense of self-ownership

Department of Psychosomatic Medicine, The University of Tokyo Hospital, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8655, Japan.
Cognition (Impact Factor: 3.63). 01/2005; 94(3):241-255. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2004.04.003
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT It is proposed that knowledge of motor commands is used to distinguish self-generated sensation from externally generated sensation. In this paper, we show that the sense of self-agency, that is the sense that I am the one who is generating an action, largely depends on the degree of discrepancy resulting from comparison between the predicted and actual sensory feedback. In Experiment 1, the sense of self-agency was reduced when the presentation of the tone was unpredictable in terms of timing and its frequency, although in fact the tone was self-produced. In Experiment 2, the opposite case was found to occur. That is, participants experienced illusionary sense of self-agency when the externally generated sensations happened to match the prediction made by forward model. In Experiment 3, the sense of self-agency was reduced when there was a discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences, regardless of presence or absence of a discrepancy between the intended and actual consequences of actions. In all the experiments, a discrepancy between the predicted and actual feedback had no effects on sense of self-ownership, that is the sense that I am the one who is undergoing an experience. These results may suggest that both senses of self are mutually independent.

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Available from: Atsushi Sato, Sep 25, 2015
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    • "Furthermore, mirror viewing during asynchronous tapping resulted in a decreased sense of agency. As agency is thought to be based on congruence between predicted and observed sensory states (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Sato & Yasuda, 2005), the mismatch caused by the discrepant visual information likely leads to a decrease in agency in the asynchronous, mirror tapping condition. "
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    ABSTRACT: We examined the relationship between subcomponents of embodiment and multisensory integration using a mirror box illusion. The participants' left hand was positioned against the mirror, while their right hidden hand was positioned 12″, 6″, or 0″ from the mirror - creating a conflict between visual and proprioceptive estimates of limb position in some conditions. After synchronous tapping, asynchronous tapping, or no movement of both hands, participants gave position estimates for the hidden limb and filled out a brief embodiment questionnaire. We found a relationship between different subcomponents of embodiment and illusory displacement towards the visual estimate. Illusory visual displacement was positively correlated with feelings of deafference in the asynchronous and no movement conditions, whereas it was positive correlated with ratings of visual capture and limb ownership in the synchronous and no movement conditions. These results provide evidence for dissociable contributions of different aspects of embodiment to multisensory integration. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
    Consciousness and Cognition 12/2015; 37:71-82. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2015.08.011 · 2.31 Impact Factor
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    • "Research has suggested that the sense of agency and sense of ownership do not use the same mechanism (Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010) and hence a distinction should be made between them (Gallagher, 2000): they ''may be partly independent and have different processes by which each of them is constructed " (Sato & Yasuda, 2005, p "
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    ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the phenomenological nature of the sense of boundaries (SB), based on the case of S, who has practiced mindfulness in the Satipathana and Theravada Vipassana traditions for about 40years and accumulated around 20,000h of meditative practice. S's unique abilities enable him to describe his inner lived experience with great precision and clarity. S was asked to shift between three different stages: (a) the default state, (b) the dissolving of the SB, and (c) the disappearance of the SB. Based on his descriptions, we identified seven categories (with some overlap) that alter during the shifts between these stages, including the senses of: (1) internal versus external, (2) time, (3) location, (4) self, (5) agency (control), (6) ownership, and (7) center (first-person-egocentric-bodily perspective). Two other categories, the touching/touched structure and one's bodily feelings, do not fade away completely even when the sense-of-boundaries disappears.
    Consciousness and Cognition 09/2015; 37:133-147. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2015.09.002 · 2.31 Impact Factor
    • "). Clicking on presented actionbuttons would generate tones, and participants were either given the opportunity to plan or were not given the opportunity to plan which button they were going to click. Participants were told that the presented tones could be generated by their mouse-clicks, but could also be produced by the computer (Sato & Yasuda, 2005); participants had to indicate the degree to which they felt that they (not the computer) had caused the tone to occur. "
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    ABSTRACT: While action plans and intentions have been considered to be important factors contributing to the personal sense of causation known as agency, the present research is the first to empirically investigate how action plans influence agency. Participants in multiple studies were required to plan or not to plan ahead their actions. Results consistently show that on trials in which participants were required to plan their actions, participants experienced reduced agency compared to trials in which participants were not required to plan their actions. These results were found for both explicit agency paradigms in which participants were asked for their experiences of causation (Studies 1 and 2), as well as in an implicit agency paradigm in which participants were asked to estimate the time between their actions and the consequences of their actions (Study 3). In addition, it was shown that the reduction in agency was smaller when plans and actions were temporally closer together (Study 4). In a final line of experiments we discovered that prior planning similarly reduced both the emotional experience of acting and feelings of responsibility in agents (Studies 5-7). However, the direction of this effect was reversed in observers, for whom cues related to planning by others increased attributions of responsibility toward those others (Study 8). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).
    Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 06/2015; 108(6):850-866. DOI:10.1037/pspa0000024 · 5.08 Impact Factor
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