The relationship of insurance status, hospital ownership, and teaching status with interhospital transfers in California in 2000
ABSTRACT Public hospitals and academic medical centers may admit more poorly insured transfer patients than do other institutions. The authors investigated the relationship of patient insurance status, hospital ownership, and hospital teaching status with interhospital transfers in California.
In 2003, data were derived from the hospital discharge abstract database for the year 2000 from the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development. Hospitals were categorized by ownership and teaching status; patients were categorized as being "good" or "poor" payers depending on the level of expected insurance reimbursement. Descriptive and multivariate analyses were used to assess the number of poor payer transfers admitted by each hospital group.
In 2000, there were 58,509 transfer and 2,320,479 direct admissions. All hospital groups admitted a higher percentage of good payer than poor payer transfer patients (85% vs. 15% respectively for all groups combined). Adjusted for total number of admissions and teaching status, the number of poor payer transfer patients admitted to county-owned and University of California hospitals was significantly higher than the statewide average (both p values < .001), while the number admitted to independent teaching hospitals was significantly lower than the statewide average (p < .001). The number of poor payer transfer patients admitted to independent teaching hospitals more closely resembled that of for-profit hospitals than that of University of California teaching hospitals.
In 2000, the likelihood of a hospital admitting a transfer patient appears to have been affected by both the patient's insurance status and the hospital's ownership. In general, good payer patients were more likely to be transferred than were poor payer patients, with poor payer transfer patients more likely to be admitted to publicly owned hospitals.
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ABSTRACT: It has long been recognized in the health economics literature that increased financial incentives for better-informed health care providers not only lead to desirable efficiency gains and cost savings but may have unintended consequences. Accounting-based cost containment instruments like capped budgets or prospective payment may induce physicians and hospitals to systematically avoid high-cost patients. Our paper uses an empirical approach backed by theoretical arguments to study a small German hospital’s reactions to a major increase in financial incentives. We first describe essential features of the German hospital sector and developments that led to the introduction of capped budgets for hospital care in 1993. Next, incentives to treat high-cost patients before and after the reform are analyzed in more detail. Using an anesthesia-related patient severity score (ASA score) as a proxy for financial patient risk, we empirically address the question of how the distribution of ASA scores has changed over time at the hospital for the 1989–2002 period. Our analysis of detailed operating room data reveals that the number of high-risk patients (high-ASA score) showed a systematic and significant decrease after the introduction of capped budgets. Using data from the new German DRG-reimbursement system, we also gain some preliminary evidence of the possible financial consequences of such practices.SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2006; 27(1-27):38-61. DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.11.002
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ABSTRACT: There has been widespread concern that procedurally oriented specialty hospitals select well-insured patients for admission, while avoiding the underinsured, but data are limited. To determine if specialty cardiac hospitals admit a higher proportion of well-insured patients than general hospitals and/or preferentially transfer patients with less generous insurance to other acute care hospitals. A retrospective study of patients admitted to specialty cardiac and general hospitals with acute myocardial infarction (AMI; N = 41,863), congestive heart failure (CHF; N = 51,696), percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI; N = 73,966), and coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG; N = 33,327) using 2000-2004 all-payor data from Arizona, California, and Texas. Proportion of all admissions in specialty and general hospitals with more generous insurance (Medicare or private insurance), interhospital transfer patterns of patients with less generous insurance by specialty and general hospitals. Specialty hospitals admitted a higher proportion of patients with more generous insurance for both the medical cohort (AMI and CHF) (92.4% vs. 89.0%; P < 0.0001) and revascularization cohort (PCI and CABG) (94.3% vs. 90.6%; P < 0.0001). After adjustment for patient demographics, comorbidity, and the distance that each patient lived from the nearest specialty and general hospital, odds of admission to specialty hospitals were significantly higher for patients with more generous insurance compared to patients with less generous insurance for the medical cohort [odds ratio (OR), 1.16; 95% confidence interval (CI), 1.07-1.27; P < 0.001] and revascularization cohort (OR, 1.17; 95% CI, 1.08-1.27; P < 0.001). In Cox proportional hazards models, there was no evidence that specialty hospitals were more or less likely to transfer patients with more or less generous insurance to another hospital. The analysis was limited to 3 states and we were unable to track the care of patients after transfer. Patients with more generous insurance are significantly more likely to gain admission to specialty hospitals. Alternatively, we found no evidence that specialty hospitals preferentially transfer patients with less generous insurance who are admitted. Overall, these findings suggest that specialty hospitals may contribute to segregation of the healthcare system along socioeconomic lines.Medical Care 05/2008; 46(5):467-75. DOI:10.1097/MLR.0b013e31816c43d9 · 3.23 Impact Factor