Constraints and triggers: situational mechanics of gender in negotiation.

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Impact Factor: 5.08). 01/2006; 89(6):951-65. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.951
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The authors propose 2 categories of situational moderators of gender in negotiation: situational ambiguity and gender triggers. Reducing the degree of situational ambiguity constrains the influence of gender on negotiation. Gender triggers prompt divergent behavioral responses as a function of gender. Field and lab studies (1 and 2) demonstrated that decreased ambiguity in the economic structure of a negotiation (structural ambiguity) reduces gender effects on negotiation performance. Study 3 showed that representation role (negotiating for self or other) functions as a gender trigger by producing a greater effect on female than male negotiation performance. Study 4 showed that decreased structural ambiguity constrains gender effects of representation role, suggesting that situational ambiguity and gender triggers work in interaction to moderate gender effects on negotiation performance.

  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Gender differences in competitiveness have been suggested as an explanation for the observed dearth of women in highly-ranked positions within firms. In this paper we ask: could a price mechanism be used to achieve gender balance? Our results show that if the rewards to competition are sufficiently large, women are willing to compete as much as men and will win as many competitions as men. Nonetheless, while entry increases, it is not enough to reduce average wage cost. Given the proportion of men and women willing to enter the competition at various prizes, firms whose objective is to minimize their costs would not voluntarily chose prizes which allow them to attract a balanced workforce. Hence markets forces would not be sufficient to achieve gender parity. Our experimental design also allows us to propose a new measure for competitiveness that incorporates the fact that incentives change participants' willingness to compete, namely the minimum prize at which participants chose to enter a tournament. We find that women choose to enter at significantly higher minimum prizes and that only a small fraction of the initial gender gap can be attributed to performance, beliefs, and general factors such as risk and feedback aversion. Thus, even though for some prizes women behave as competitively as men, women nevertheless are less competitive than men. JEL codes:
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This study experimentally examined how power and gender affect negotiation behaviors and how those behaviors affect negotiated outcomes. One hundred and forty-six dyads, in four combinations of power and gender, negotiated compensation agreements. In line with gender stereotypes, male negotiators were more dominating and females more obliging and somewhat more compromising. However, partially challenging the common association of power and masculinity, high-power negotiators were less dominating and more collaborating, obliging and avoiding than their low-power opponents. Generally, feminine and high-power behaviors induced agreement while masculine and low-power behaviors enhanced distributive personal gain. The study also assessed patterns of behavioral reciprocity and used sophisticated analytic tools to control for dyadic interdependence. Therefore it helps to elucidate the negotiation process and the role that power and its interplay with gender play in it.
    Negotiation and Conflict Management Research 02/2015; 8(1). · 0.76 Impact Factor
  • The Journal of Education for Business 03/2014; 89(3):149-155.

Preview (2 Sources)

Available from