Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes

Division of Biology 216-76, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Impact Factor: 21.15). 02/2007; 11(1):16-22. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.012
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The close relationship between attention and consciousness has led many scholars to conflate these processes. This article summarizes psychophysical evidence, arguing that top-down attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena that need not occur together and that can be manipulated using distinct paradigms. Subjects can become conscious of an isolated object or the gist of a scene despite the near absence of top-down attention; conversely, subjects can attend to perceptually invisible objects. Furthermore, top-down attention and consciousness can have opposing effects. Such dissociations are easier to understand when the different functions of these two processes are considered. Untangling their tight relationship is necessary for the scientific elucidation of consciousness and its material substrate.

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Available from: Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Feb 18, 2014
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