Article

Containment of polioviruses after eradication and OPV cessation: characterizing risks to improve management.

Polio Eradication Program, The Task Force for Child Survival and Development, 750 Commerce Dr., Suite 400, Decatur, GA 30030, USA.
Risk Analysis (impact factor: 2.37). 01/2007; 26(6):1449-69. DOI:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00844.x
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The goal of the World Health Organization is to stop routine use of oral poliovirus vaccine shortly after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. A key component of this goal is to minimize the risk of reintroduction by destruction of polioviruses except in an absolute minimum number of facilities that serve essential functions and implement effective containment. Effective containment begins with a complete facility risk assessment. This article focuses on characterizing the risks of exposure to polioviruses from the essential vaccine production, quality control, and international reference and research facilities that remain. We consider the potential exposure pathways that might lead to a poliovirus reintroduction, including para-occupational exposures and releases to the environment, and review the literature to provide available estimates and a qualitative assessment of containment risks. Minimizing the risk of poliovirus transmission from a poliovirus facility to increasingly susceptible communities is a crucial and ongoing effort requiring understanding and actively managing the potential exposure pathways.

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Keywords

absolute minimum number
 
available estimates
 
complete facility risk assessment
 
containment risks
 
Effective containment
 
essential vaccine production
 
international reference
 
key component
 
ongoing effort
 
oral poliovirus vaccine
 
poliovirus facility
 
poliovirus reintroduction
 
poliovirus transmission
 
polioviruses
 
quality control
 
routine use
 
serve essential functions
 
susceptible communities
 
wild poliovirus transmission
 
World Health Organization