Authorized Generic Drugs, Price Competition, And Consumers’ Welfare
ABSTRACT The growing frequency of authorized generics has important implications for the welfare of prescription drug consumers. Authorized generic entry could affect the timing of generic entry, brand-name and generic prices, and generic penetration. We reviewed 1999-2003 data and found that generic entry in the absence of short-run exclusivity restrictions benefits consumers through lower short-run prices. We suggest that these benefits likely also result from authorized generics. We posit that long-run prices and shares are likely essentially unaffected by authorized generics and that potential costs to consumers from any delayed generic entry are likely small.
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ABSTRACT: The goal of this study is to examine how four factors - level of competition, therapeutic purpose, age of the drug, and manufacturer play a role in the pricing of brand-name prescription drugs. Understanding how these factors contribute to high drug prices will allow players in this supply chain to negotiate more favorable contract terms. This can be a large benefit to society as this insight can lead to improved efficiency in pricing and increased savings, which can be passed to the consumer.We develop measures for these factors based on publicly available information. Using data on the wholesale prices of prescription drugs, we estimate a model for drug prices based on our measures of competition, therapeutic purpose, age, and manufacturer. Our analysis reveals that these factors are significant in estimating drug prices. We observe that proliferation of dosing levels tends to reduce the prices, therapeutic conditions which are both less common and more life-threatening lead to higher prices, older drugs are less expensive than newer drugs, and some manufacturers set prices systematically different from others even after controlling for other factors. These findings indicate that publicly observable factors can be used to explain drug prices.Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 09/2013; 47(3):238–246. DOI:10.1016/j.seps.2012.11.001
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ABSTRACT: This paper looks at producers of branded and generic pharmaceuticals’ pricing decisions under two possible reimbursement schemes—reference pricing and fixed percentage reimbursement—and under two settings—one where the branded producer only sells the (off-patent) branded pharmaceutical and another where, in addition, it may also sell its own generic version, a so called pseudo-generic. We find different pricing responses from firms under the two reimbursement schemes and across the two settings analysed (with or without a pseudo-generic), and show that pseudo-generics may have an anticompetitive effect. Our results have important policy implications such as showing that the presence of pseudo-generics reinforces reference pricing’s advantages over alternative reimbursement schemes.01/2015; DOI:10.1007/s10754-015-9165-1
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ABSTRACT: Observers worry that generic patent challenges are on the rise and reduce the effective market life of drugs. A related concern is that challenges disproportionately target high-sales drugs, reducing market life for these "blockbusters." To study these questions, we examine new data on generic entry over the past decade. We show that challenges are more common for higher sales drugs. We also demonstrate a slight increase in challenges over this period, and a sharper increase for early challenges. Despite this, effective market life is stable across drug sales categories, and has hardly changed over the decade. To better understand these results, we examine which patents are challenged on each drug, and show that lower quality and later expiring patents disproportionately draw challenges. Overall, this evidence suggests that challenges serve to maintain, not reduce, the historical baseline of effective market life, thereby limiting the effectiveness of "evergreening" by branded firms.Journal of Health Economics 02/2012; 31(2):327-39. DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.01.004 · 2.25 Impact Factor