Interference resolution: insights from a meta-analysis of neuroimaging tasks.

Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1043, USA.
Cognitive Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience (Impact Factor: 3.21). 04/2007; 7(1):1-17. DOI: 10.3758/CABN.7.1.1
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT A quantitative meta-analysis was performed on 47 neuroimaging studies involving tasks purported to require the resolution of interference. The tasks included the Stroop, flanker, go/no-go, stimulus-response compatibility, Simon, and stop signal tasks. Peak density-based analyses of these combined tasks reveal that the anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex, and anterior insula may be important sites for the detection and/or resolution of interference. Individual task analyses reveal differential patterns of activation among the tasks. We propose that the drawing of distinctions among the processing stages at which interference may be resolved may explain regional activation differences. Our analyses suggest that resolution processes acting upon stimulus encoding, response selection, and response execution may recruit different neural regions.


Available from: Derek Evan Nee, Apr 10, 2014
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Studies of human intelligence provide strong evidence for the neural efficiency hypothesis, which suggests more efficient brain functioning (i.e., less or more focused activation) in more intelligent individuals. Recent studies have specified the scope of the neural efficiency hypothesis by suggesting that the relationship between brain activation and intelligence only holds true for problems of moderate difficulty and can be altered through training and is only found in frontal brain regions. We investigated the moderating roles of task difficulty and training on the neural efficiency phenomenon in the context of working memory (WM) training.
    Intelligence 05/2015; 50:196-208. DOI:10.1016/j.intell.2015.04.004 · 2.67 Impact Factor
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Direct assessment of attitudes toward socially sensitive topics can be affected by deception attempts. Reaction-time based indirect measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT), are less susceptible to such biases. Neuroscientific evidence shows that deception can evoke characteristic ERP differences. However, the cerebral processes involved in faking an IAT are still unknown. We randomly assigned 20 university students (15 females, 24.65 ± 3.50 years of age) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design, requesting them to complete a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on attitudes toward doping without deception instruction, and with the instruction to fake positive and negative doping attitudes. Cerebral activity during BIAT completion was assessed using high-density EEG. Event-related potentials during faking revealed enhanced frontal and reduced occipital negativity, starting around 150ms after stimulus presentation. Further, a decrease in the P300 and LPP components was observed. Source analyses showed enhanced activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus between 150 and 200ms during faking, thought to reflect the suppression of automatic responses. Further, more activity was found for faking in the bilateral middle occipital gyri and the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Results indicate that faking reaction-time based tests alter brain processes from early stages of processing and reveal the cortical sources of the effects. Analyzing the EEG helps to uncover response patterns in indirect attitude tests and broadens our understanding of the neural processes involved in such faking. This knowledge might be useful for uncovering faking in socially sensitive contexts, where attitudes are likely to be concealed.
    Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 05/2015; 9(139). DOI:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00139 · 4.16 Impact Factor
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Kurzban and colleagues carry forward an important contemporary movement in cognitive control research, tending away from resource-based models and toward a framework focusing on motivation or value. However, their specific proposal, centering on opportunity costs, appears problematic. We favor a simpler view, according to which the exertion of cognitive control carries intrinsic subjective costs.
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12/2013; 36(6):697-8. DOI:10.1017/S0140525X1300109X · 14.96 Impact Factor