Conflicting Social Motives in Negotiating Groups

David A. Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburg, PA 15213, USA.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Impact Factor: 5.08). 01/2008; 93(6):994-1010. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.994
Source: PubMed


Negotiators' social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. In this study, the authors used multilevel modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5-issue mixed-motive decision-making task were videotaped, and the tapes were transcribed and coded. Group composition included 2 homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and 3 heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators and 1 individualist, 2 cooperators and 2 individualists, 1 cooperator and 3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than did individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition.

37 Reads
  • Source
    • "As a result of the combination between these dimensions, there are usually five possible behaviors described: avoiding behavior , which indicates low concern for own and other goals; accommodating behavior, which indicates low concern for own goals combined with high concern for the goals of others; forcing, which indicates high concern for own and low concern for others; compromising, which indicates intermediate concern for own paired with intermediate concern for others, and problem solving, which indicates high concern for self and others (de Dreu et al. 2001). Much attention has been given to problem solving, compromising and forcing in Europe (de Dreu and van de Vliert 1997; Munduate et al. 1999) the US (Tjosvold et al. 1999; Weingart et al. 2007) and through comparative cross-cultural studies (Adair and Brett 2005). Less attention has been given to accommodating behavior. "
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Historically, the role of worker representatives (WRs) is traditionally perceived as masculine. With an increasing participation of women in the workforce, the number of female WRs grows all over Europe. WRs’ main task is to negotiate on behalf of the constituency. We explore how male and female WRs perceive support from their constituency and how this perceived support is related to their negotiation behavior. We test hypotheses about the impact of gender and societal culture on perceived support and accommodating behavior in negotiations. The hypotheses are tested using a quantitative approach among 219 female and 495 male WRs in Spain and 166 female and 398 male WRs in the Netherlands. Following the research question there was no evidence indicating gender differences in accommodating behavior. Results show that a) WRs accommodate less to management in Spain than in the Netherlands; b) female WRs perceive less social support than their male counterparts in Spain, but not in the Netherlands; c) social support is negatively related to accommodating behavior only for female WRs in Spain, but not in the Netherlands. We discuss theoretical and practical implications.
    Sex Roles 07/2014; 70(11-12). DOI:10.1007/s11199-014-0378-4 · 1.47 Impact Factor
  • Source
    • "Our second contribution to previous work relates to the effects of minority status on representative negotiation behavior and outcome. Our findings corroborate earlier work by Steinel et al. (2009; Weingart et al., 2007) who also showed that hawkish factions have disproportionate influence. Steinel and colleagues proposed that hawkish messages attract more attention than dovish ones and are processed faster. "
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Intergroup conflicts are often regulated by negotiating group representatives, who are influenced by constituent pressures. We examined how within-constituent disagreement influences representative negotiations. In a 2 × 2 experiment, the majority of constituents was either hawkish or dovish vis-à-vis the out-group, and the minority had either low or high status. After being exposed to constituent voice, representatives negotiated in a multi-issue task with integrative potential. Results showed that representatives reached more integrative agreements when the constituent majority was dovish rather than hawkish, but only when the hawkish minority had low rather than high status; when the hawkish minority had high status, representatives reached suboptimal agreements equal to those reached when the constituent majority was hawkish. Additional results showed that under these circumstances, representatives perceived the cooperativeness of their constituency as highest and also had the most trust that the constituency would approve of the agreement. Implications are discussed for theory on intergroup relations, (representative) negotiation, and conflict resolution.
    Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11/2012; 15(6):713-724. DOI:10.1177/1368430212441638 · 1.24 Impact Factor
  • Source
    • "Substantiation and offers ( especially single - issue offers ) also tend to cluster , empirically ( Weingart et al . , 2007 ) . That is , negotiators who make frequent single - issue offers also use an Culture , Trust , and Negotiation 12 array of substantiation tactics ( e . g . , threats , power plays , appeals to fairness , etc . ) . We label this second , well - researched negotiation strategy consisting of substantiation and offers " S&O . " American ne"
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.
    Journal of Applied Psychology 07/2011; 96(4):774-89. DOI:10.1037/a0021986 · 4.31 Impact Factor
Show more


37 Reads
Available from