Is it mine? Hemispheric asymmetries in corporeal self-recognition.
ABSTRACT The aim of this study was to investigate whether the recognition of "self body parts" is independent from the recognition of other people's body parts. If this is the case, the ability to recognize "self body parts" should be selectively impaired after lesion involving specific brain areas. To verify this hypothesis, patients with lesion of the right (right brain-damaged [RBD]) or left (left brain-damaged [LBD]) hemisphere and healthy subjects were submitted to a visual matching-to-sample task in two experiments. In the first experiment, stimuli depicted their own body parts or other people's body parts. In the second experiment, stimuli depicted parts of three categories: objects, bodies, and faces. In both experiments, participants were required to decide which of two vertically aligned images (the upper or the lower one) matched the central target stimulus. The results showed that the task indirectly tapped into bodily self-processing mechanisms, in that both LBD patients and normal subjects performed the task better when they visually matched their own, as compared to others', body parts. In contrast, RBD patients did not show such an advantage for self body parts. Moreover, they were more impaired than LBD patients and normal subjects when visually matching their own body parts, whereas this difference was not evident in performing the task with other people's body parts. RBD patients' performance for the other stimulus categories (face, body, object), although worse than LBD patients' and normal subjects' performance, was comparable across categories. These findings suggest that the right hemisphere may be involved in the recognition of self body parts, through a fronto-parietal network.
- SourceAvailable from: Frederique de Vignemont[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Mirroring has been almost exclusively analysed in motor terms with no reference to the body that carries the action. According to the standard view, one activates motor representations upon seeing other people moving. However, one does not only see movements, one also sees another individual's body. The following questions then arise. To what extent does one recruit body representations in social context? And does it imply that body representations are shared between self and others? This latter question is all the more legitimate since recent evidence indicates the existence of shared cortical networks for bodily sensations, including pain (e.g., Singer et al., 2004) and touch (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005). But if body representations are shared, then it seems that their activation cannot suffice to discriminate between one's body and other people's bodies. Does one then need a 'Whose' system to recognize one's body as one's own, in the same way that Jeannerod argues that one needs a 'Who' system to recognize one's actions as one's own?Neuropsychologia 08/2013; · 3.48 Impact Factor