Innovación en Asociaciones Público Privadas (PPPs): una aplicación al caso español

Interuniversity Research Master and Doctorate Program (with a quality mention of ANECA) on "Business Economics", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos, Salamanca and Le�n (Spain). Until 2008, Interunive, Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Direcci�n de Empresas" 01/2007;
Source: RePEc


El presente trabajo tiene por objetivo verificar los factores que determinan la posible innovaci�n en proyectos de Asociaciones P�blico-Privadas (PPPs) en Espa�a. Se proponen cuatro factores posibles determinantes de la innovaci�n en proyectos de PPPs: riesgo asumido por el sector privado, transferencia de la responsabilidad de dise�o, sanci�n que puede recibir el sector privado si la infraestructura no se encuentra de acuerdo con lo especificado en el contrato en t�rminos de calidad y competencia entre los licitadores. Para conocer y cuantificar el impacto de dichos factores sobre la innovaci�n en proyectos de PPPs se realiz� un estudio emp�rico sobre una muestra de 68 contratos firmados por empresas espa�olas del sector de la construcci�n. Los resultados obtenidos permiten concluir que existe una relaci�n significativa entre los factores propuestos y la innovaci�n tecnol�gica en las PPPs, sin embargo, no hay una relaci�n significativa para el caso de la innovaci�n no tecnol�gica.

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Available from: Thais Rangel, Jan 30, 2015
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