Airline Schedule Competition

Review of Industrial Organization (Impact Factor: 0.48). 02/2007; 30(3):161-177. DOI: 10.1007/s11151-007-9140-1
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT This paper presents a simple model of airline schedule competition that circumvents the complexities of the spatial approach used in earlier papers. Consumers choose between two duopoly carriers, each of which has evenly spaced flights, by comparing the combinations of fare and expected schedule delay that they offer. In contrast to the spatial approach, the particular departure times of individual flights are thus not relevant. The model generates a number of useful comparative-static predictions, while welfare analysis shows that equilibrium flight frequencies tend to be inefficiently low.

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