Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

Public Choice (Impact Factor: 0.91). 01/2007; 131(3):453-464. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9125-x
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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    Journal of Economic Literature 02/2003; 41(4):1137-1187. · 9.24 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: This is a model of a contest where, in order to win, each opponent can use two instruments. The probabilities of winning are explored, as well as the expenditures of the interest groups, and the relative rent-dissipation in both cases where the players have the option to use only one instrument (the standard Tullock contest) and where the players have the option to use two instruments in the contest. We show that the use of two instruments strengthens the player with the higher stake, decreases the relative rent dissipation and it decreases total expenditure if the parties are sufficiently asymmetric. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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