Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

Public Choice (Impact Factor: 0.91). 06/2007; 131(3):453-464. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9125-x
Source: RePEc


We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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Available from: Lambert Schoonbeek, Sep 18, 2014
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