Estudios pioneros en torno al origen del lenguaje natural

Arbor 02/2011; DOI: 10.3989/arbor.2011.747n1001
Source: DOAJ


It has being an ancient desire to ask apes what their natural lives are. De la Mettrie was the first to propose, in the 18th C., that the sign language of deaf adults could be used with them since they do not speak. We enhance here some of the pioneering projects of the two strategies for this endeavor: the use of ASL and the utilization of lexigrams and computers. Besides the ancient communicative quest with them, the evolutionist’s perspective has seen in these studies a way to find out how the natural language (NL) emerged in hominids. If it is clear that apes do no possess totally the NL, the linguistic turn in primatology has left way, as in philosophy, to more complex field and laboratory cognitive studies of less anthropocentric nature.Tratar de hablar con los simios y preguntarles cosas sobre su vida natural es un viejo deseo. De la Mettrie propone, en el s. XVIII, que se les enseñe el lenguaje de los sordos en vista de que no pueden hablar. Resaltamos aquí algunos estudios pioneros en relación con las dos estrategias llevadas a cabo para tratar de hablar con los simios: el uso del lenguaje americano de sordos (ASL) y el de los lexigramas y computadoras. Además del viejo interés interrogativo humano hacia ellos, la perspectiva evolucionista ha visto en estos estudios un medio de investigar cómo surgió el lenguaje natural (LN) en homínidos. Si queda claro que los simios no poseen totalmente el LN, el giro lingüistico en primatología ha cedido, como en filosofía, el paso a estudios cognitivos más complejos, de campo y de laboratorio, de orientación menos antropomórfica.

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Available from: Jorge Martinez-Contreras, Sep 29, 2015
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