Article
Immunogenicity profile of a 3.75-μg hemagglutinin pandemic rH5N1 split virion AS03A-adjuvanted vaccine in elderly persons: a randomized trial.
ResearchLink, Department Clinical Trial Network, Linkebeek, Flemish Brabant, Belgium.
The Journal of Infectious Diseases (impact factor:
6.41).
04/2011;
203(8):1054-62.
DOI:10.1093/infdis/jiq174
Source: PubMed
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Article: Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic
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ABSTRACT: Development of strategies for mitigating the severity of a new influenza pandemic is now a top global public health priority. Influenza prevention and containment strategies can be considered under the broad categories of antiviral, vaccine and non-pharmaceutical (case isolation, household quarantine, school or workplace closure, restrictions on travel) measures. Mathematical models are powerful tools for exploring this complex landscape of intervention strategies and quantifying the potential costs and benefits of different options. Here we use a large-scale epidemic simulation to examine intervention options should initial containment of a novel influenza outbreak fail, using Great Britain and the United States as examples. We find that border restrictions and/or internal travel restrictions are unlikely to delay spread by more than 2-3 weeks unless more than 99% effective. School closure during the peak of a pandemic can reduce peak attack rates by up to 40%, but has little impact on overall attack rates, whereas case isolation or household quarantine could have a significant impact, if feasible. Treatment of clinical cases can reduce transmission, but only if antivirals are given within a day of symptoms starting. Given enough drugs for 50% of the population, household-based prophylaxis coupled with reactive school closure could reduce clinical attack rates by 40-50%. More widespread prophylaxis would be even more logistically challenging but might reduce attack rates by over 75%. Vaccine stockpiled in advance of a pandemic could significantly reduce attack rates even if of low efficacy. Estimates of policy effectiveness will change if the characteristics of a future pandemic strain differ substantially from those seen in past pandemics.01/2006; 442:448-52. -
Article: Mitigation strategies for pandemic influenza in the United States.
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ABSTRACT: Recent human deaths due to infection by highly pathogenic (H5N1) avian influenza A virus have raised the specter of a devastating pandemic like that of 1917-1918, should this avian virus evolve to become readily transmissible among humans. We introduce and use a large-scale stochastic simulation model to investigate the spread of a pandemic strain of influenza virus through the U.S. population of 281 million individuals for R(0) (the basic reproductive number) from 1.6 to 2.4. We model the impact that a variety of levels and combinations of influenza antiviral agents, vaccines, and modified social mobility (including school closure and travel restrictions) have on the timing and magnitude of this spread. Our simulations demonstrate that, in a highly mobile population, restricting travel after an outbreak is detected is likely to delay slightly the time course of the outbreak without impacting the eventual number ill. For R(0) < 1.9, our model suggests that the rapid production and distribution of vaccines, even if poorly matched to circulating strains, could significantly slow disease spread and limit the number ill to <10% of the population, particularly if children are preferentially vaccinated. Alternatively, the aggressive deployment of several million courses of influenza antiviral agents in a targeted prophylaxis strategy may contain a nascent outbreak with low R(0), provided adequate contact tracing and distribution capacities exist. For higher R(0), we predict that multiple strategies in combination (involving both social and medical interventions) will be required to achieve similar limits on illness rates.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 05/2006; 103(15):5935-40. · 9.68 Impact Factor -
Article: Broad Clade 2 cross-reactive immunity induced by an adjuvanted clade 1 rH5N1 pandemic influenza vaccine.
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ABSTRACT: The availability of H5N1 vaccines that can elicit a broad cross-protective immunity against different currently circulating clade 2 H5N1 viruses is a pre-requisite for the development of a successful pre-pandemic vaccination strategy. In this regard, it has recently been shown that adjuvantation of a recombinant clade 1 H5N1 inactivated split-virion vaccine with an oil-in-water emulsion-based adjuvant system also promoted cross-immunity against a recent clade 2 H5N1 isolate (A/Indonesia/5/2005, subclade 2.1). Here we further analyse the cross-protective potential of the vaccine against two other recent clade 2 isolates (A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 and A/Anhui/1/2005 which are, as defined by WHO, representatives of subclades 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). Two doses of the recombinant A/Vietnam/1194/2004 (H5N1, clade 1) vaccine were administered 21 days apart to volunteers aged 18-60 years. We studied the cross-clade immunogenicity of the lowest antigen dose (3.8 microg haemagglutinin) given with (N = 20) or without adjuvant (N = 20). Immune responses were assessed at 21 days following the first and second vaccine doses and at 6 months following first vaccination. Vaccination with two doses of 3.8 microg of the adjuvanted vaccine induced four-fold neutralising seroconversion rates in 85% of subjects against A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005 (subclade 2.2) and 75% of subjects against A/Anhui/1/2005 (subclade 2.3) recombinant strains. There was no response induced against these strains in the non-adjuvanted group. At 6 months following vaccination, 70% and 60% of subjects retained neutralising antibodies against the recombinant subclade 2.2 and 2.3 strains, respectively and 40% of subjects retained antibodies against the recombinant subclade 2.1 A/Indonesia/5/2005 strain. In addition to antigen dose-sparing, adjuvantation of inactivated split H5N1 vaccine promotes broad and persistent cross-clade immunity which is a pre-requisite for a pre-pandemic vaccine. ClinicalTrials.gov NCT00309634.PLoS ONE 02/2008; 3(2):e1665. · 4.09 Impact Factor
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Keywords
Antigen-specific CD4 T cell responses
AS03(A)-adjuvanted groups
AS03(A)-adjuvanted H5N1 pandemic vaccine
AS03(A)-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccine
Day 42 geometric
days 0
double dose
double doses
elderly population
Human Medicinal Products criteria
Immune response
Immune response persistence
neutralizing antibody response
primary end point
reduced immune response
seroprotection rates
single dose
usual dose
younger adults
μg hemagglutinin