Article

Defense resource distribution between protection and redundancy for constant resource stockpiling pace.

Collaborative Autonomic Computing Laboratory, School of Computer Science, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China.
Risk Analysis (Impact Factor: 2.28). 03/2011; 31(10):1632-45. DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01593.x
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The article considers the optimal resource distribution in a parallel system between increasing protection and providing redundancy in a situation when the attacker's and defender's resources are stockpiling and the resource increment rate is constant. It is assumed that the system must perform within an exogenously given time horizon and the attack time probability is uniformly distributed along this horizon. The defender optimizes the resource distribution in order to minimize the system destruction probability during the time horizon. First, we find the optimal pace of construction of the new redundant elements assuming that the construction must start in the initial stage of the stockpiling process. We show that starting construction of new elements in the beginning of the system's existence results in its high initial vulnerability. Introducing the time delay before starting the construction can reduce the initial system vulnerability and the entire system destruction probability. The problem of optimization of time delay and new element construction pace is considered with and without constraint on the initial system vulnerability. Examples illustrating the methodology of the optimal defense strategy analysis are presented.

0 Bookmarks
 · 
47 Views
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: We discuss strategic interactions between an attacker and either centralized or decentralized defenders, and identify conditions under which centralized defender decision making is preferred. One important implication of our results is that partial secrecy about defensive allocations (disclosure of the total level of defensive investment, but secrecy about which resources are defended) can be a strategy for achieving more cost-effective attack deterrence. In particular, we show that such partial secrecy can be potentially beneficial when security investments are discrete (e.g., as in the use of air marshals to counter threats to commercial aviation).
    01/2009;
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: A production and conflict (P&C) model and a rent-seeking (RS) model are compared for one group, two groups and K groups. Adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the P&C model, but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the RS model. The total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within-group and between-group decisiveness. Productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role. The collective action problem is more severe for the RS model. As group size increases, the ratio of within-group to between-group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the P&C model, while it increases convexly for the RS model. Adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in RS groups than in P&C groups, while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result. The severe between-group fighting in the P&C model for many groups causes the P&C model to be preferable for few groups, while the RS model is preferable for many groups. Applications are considered to intergroup migration, inside versus outside ownership, divestitures, mergers and acquisitions, multidivisional versus single-tier firms and U form versus M form of economic organization. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
    Public Choice 02/2005; 123(1):59-93. · 0.91 Impact Factor