Bicameralism and Government Formation

SSRN Electronic Journal 01/2004; DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.312149
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT There is a vast empirical literature on the allocation of corporate PAC contributions in Congressional elections and the influence that these contributions have on the policy-making process. The attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance. Corporate PAC contributions account for about 10% of Congressional campaign spending and major corporations allocate far more money to lobbying or philanthropy than their affiliated PACs make in contributions.


Available from: Antonio Merlo, Apr 29, 2015
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