«Propiedad Común de la Tierra», Derechos Humanos y Justicia Global
ABSTRACT After comparing Risse’s conception of Common Property of the Earth (PCT) with other theories of global redistribution (Steiner, Pogge) or with conceptions of human rights in terms of membership (Cohen, Benhabib), we conclude that PCT as theory of distributive justice defends an unnecessarily low threshold; and as human rights conception doesn’t provide robustness in socioeconomic measures. Finally, the specification of human rights out of global membership cannot be translated into a «right not to be excluded from the new public property» (Sachar). This is so because the mere subsistence condition in human rights does not necessarily imply the condition of independence in the original status of co-owner. Therefore, this contingent derivation of human rights does not meet the transitivity required by its own justification requirements.Tras comparar la concepción de Risse de Propiedad Común de la Tierra (PCT) con otras alternativas teóricas de redistribución global (Steiner, Pogge) o de reformulación de los derechos humanos en términos de membrecía (Cohen, Benhabib), concluimos que PCT, como teoría de justicia distributiva global, defiende un umbral innecesariamente bajo; y como concepción de derechos humanos no fundamenta con robustez las garantías socioeconómicas. Finalmente, la especificación de los derechos humanos a partir de la membrecía global no es traducible a términos de «derecho a no-exclusión de la nueva propiedad pública» (Sachar), ya que la condición de subsistencia de los derechos humanos no implica necesariamente la condición de independencia del estatus de co-propietario original. Así pues, esta derivación contingente de los derechos humanos no cumple la condición de transitividad exigida por sus requisitos internos de justificación.
- SourceAvailable from: hks.harvard.edu[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. Some philosophers find left-libertarianism promising because it seems that it coherently underwrites both some demands of material equality and some limits on the permissible means of promoting such equality. However, the main goal of this article is to argue that, as far as coherence is concerned, at least one formulation of left-libertarianism is in trouble. This formulation is that of Michael Otsuka, who published it first in a 1998 article, and now in his thought-provoking book Libertarianism Without Inequality. In a nutshell, my objection is that the set of reasons that support egalitarian ownership of natural resources as Otsuka understands it stand in a deep tension with the set of reasons that would prompt one to endorse Otsuka’s right to self-ownership. In light of their underlying commitments, a defender of either of the views that left-libertarianism combines would actually have to reject the other. This incoherence, it seems, can only be remedied either by an approach that renders left-libertarianism incomplete in a way that can only be fixed by endorsing more commitments than most left-libertarians would want to or by an approach that leaves left-libertarianism a philosophically shallow theory.Politics Philosophy & Economics 01/2004; 3(3):337-364. · 0.14 Impact Factor
- [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the impact of globalization on international law and the discourse of sovereignty. It challenges the claim that we have entered into a new world order characterized by transnational governance and decentered global law, which have replaced “traditional” international law and rendered the concepts of state sovereignty and international society anachronistic. We are indeed in the presence of something new. But if we drop the concept of sovereignty and buy into the idea that transnational governance has upstaged international treaty organizations, we will misconstrue the nature of contemporary international society and the political choices facing us. In the contemporary context where there is a powerful imperial project afoot (on the part of the United States) that seeks to develop a useful version of global (cosmopolitan) right to justify its self-interested interventions, proposals to abandon the default position of sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of nonintervention in international law, are both premature and dangerous. Instead, we should rethink the normative dimensions of the concept of sovereignty in light of the new principle of sovereign equality articulated in the UN Charter, and show how it can complement cosmopolitan principles such as human rights and collective security. The task is to strengthen, not abandon, international law and supranational institutions, and to foster a global rule of law that protects both the sovereign equality of states, based on a revised conception of sovereignty, and human rights.Ethics & International Affairs 11/2004; 18(3):1 - 24.