Approximate Bertrand Equilibria in a Replicated Industry.

Review of Economic Studies (Impact Factor: 2.81). 02/1987; 54(1):47-62.
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT The paper considers the existence and properties of approximate Bertrand equilibr ia in a replicated industry. Price setting firms produce a homogeneous product w ith weakly convex costs. The main results are that an e-equilibrium exists if th e industry is large enough; and that if the e is small enough, and the industry large enough, any e-equilibrium is approximately competitive. These resultsdepe nd on how contingent demand is specified. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

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