Article
Influenza A (H1N1) in Victoria, Australia: a community case series and analysis of household transmission.
Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, Melbourne, Australia.
PLoS ONE (impact factor:
4.09).
01/2010;
5(10):e13702.
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0013702
pp.e13702
Source: PubMed
-
Article: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza: experience from the critical care unit
[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: This case series details experience of critical care admissions with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza from an intensive care unit in the West Midlands. We present four critically ill patients admitted with severe hypoxia. Two of the patients failed a trial of continuous positive airway pressure and all underwent controlled ventilation within 24 h of admission. Bilevel and high frequency oscillatory ventilation were the most useful modes. Our patients generally had one organ failure and were ventilator dependent for relatively short periods of time. Three of the patients made a full recovery and one required ongoing dialysis. We also discuss service planning and our response to the pandemic. We were well prepared with stocks of personal protective equipment but had to modify plans as the outbreak progressed. Our cases and discussion provide useful information for other intensive care units preparing for the predicted autumn surge of H1N1 cases.Anaesthesia 10/2009; 64(11):1241 - 1245. · 2.96 Impact Factor -
Article: Epidemiological characteristics of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 and seasonal influenza infection.
[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: The median age of patients with pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 infection was reported as 20-25 years in initial case series from Europe and the United States. This has been lowered to 13 years in the US after testing of more patients, but this may reflect differential increased testing of school-aged children as part of the pandemic response. The median age of patients with seasonal influenza A(H1N1) infection identified through sentinel surveillance in Western Australia and Victoria in 2007-2008 was 18 and 22 years, respectively. For pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 infection, the median age of the first 244 patients identified in WA was 22 years, and median age of the first 135 patients identified through sentinel surveillance in Victoria was 21 years. Other comparisons of the epidemiological features of pandemic and seasonal influenza are difficult because much less laboratory testing is done for seasonal than for pandemic influenza. While early surveillance data indicated co-circulation of both pandemic and seasonal strains in WA and Victoria, more recent data from both states indicate an increasing predominance of pandemic influenza. If the evolving pandemic allows, we should take advantage of the increased testing being conducted for pandemic influenza to learn more about the real impact of laboratory-confirmed seasonal influenza.The Medical journal of Australia 09/2009; 191(3):146-9. · 2.81 Impact Factor -
Article: Experience and lessons from surveillance and studies of the 2009 pandemic in Europe.
[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Surveillance and studies in a pandemic is a complex topic including four distinct components: (1) early detection and investigation; (2) comprehensive early assessment; (3) monitoring; and (4) rapid investigation of the effectiveness and impact of countermeasures, including monitoring the safety of pharmaceutical countermeasures. In the 2009 pandemic, the prime early detection and investigation took place in the Americas, but Europe needed to undertake the other three components while remaining vigilant to new phenomenon such as the emergence of antiviral resistance and important viral mutation. Laboratory-based surveillance was essential and also integral to epidemiological and clinical surveillance. Early assessment was especially vital because of the many important strategic parameters of the pandemic that could not be anticipated (the 'known unknowns'). Such assessment did not need to be undertaken in every country, and was done by the earliest affected European countries, particularly those with stronger surveillance. This was more successful than requiring countries to forward primary data for central analysis. However, it sometimes proved difficult to get even those analyses from European counties, and information from Southern hemisphere countries and North America proved equally valuable. These analyses informed which public health and clinical measures were most likely to be successful, and were summarized in a European risk assessment that was updated repeatedly. The estimate of the severity of the pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), and more detailed description by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in the risk assessment along with revised planning assumptions were essential, as most national European plans envisaged triggering more disruptive interventions in the event of a severe pandemic. Setting up new surveillance systems in the midst of the pandemic and getting information from them was generally less successful. All European countries needed to perform monitoring (Component 3) for the proper management of their own healthcare systems and other services. The information that central authorities might like to have for monitoring was legion, and some countries found it difficult to limit this to what was essential for decisions and key communications. Monitoring should have been tested for feasibility in influenza seasons, but also needed to consider what surveillance systems will change or cease to deliver during a pandemic. International monitoring (reporting upwards to WHO and European authorities) had to be kept simple as many countries found it difficult to provide routine information to international bodies as well as undertaking internal processes. Investigation of the effectiveness of countermeasures (and the safety of pharmaceutical countermeasures) (Component 4) is another process that only needs to be undertaken in some countries. Safety monitoring proved especially important because of concerns over the safety of vaccines and antivirals. It is unlikely that it will become clear whether and which public health measures have been successful during the pandemic itself. Piloting of methods of estimating influenza vaccine effectiveness (part of Component 4) in Europe was underway in 2008. It was concluded that for future pandemics, authorities should plan how they will undertake Components 2-4, resourcing them realistically and devising new ways of sharing analyses.Public health 01/2010; 124(1):14-23. · 1.26 Impact Factor
Data provided are for informational purposes only. Although carefully collected, accuracy cannot be guaranteed.
The impact factor represents a rough estimation of the journal's impact factor and does not reflect the actual
current impact factor.
Publisher conditions are provided by RoMEO. Differing provisions from the publisher's actual policy or licence
agreement may be applicable.
Keywords
132 index cases
18 years old
2009 Victorian Influenza Sentinel Surveillance program
cases
community cases
crude secondary attack rate
epidemiological characteristics
household transmission
illness features
Increased ILI rates
Influenza-like illness
influenza-like symptoms
larger numbers
median symptom duration
Multivariate analysis
pandemic influenza
seasonal influenza
secondary ILI rates
similar clinical characteristics
virus excretion