Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security

American Economic Review (Impact Factor: 2.69). 01/2005; 95(2):127-131. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.651881
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT This paper uses a natural experiment approach to identify the effects of an exogenouschange in future pension benefits on workers’ training participation. We use uniquematched survey and administrative data for male employees in the Dutch public sectorwho were born in 1949 or 1950. Only the latter were subject to a major pension reformthat diminished their pension rights. We find that this exogenous shock to pension rightspostpones expected retirement and increases participation in training courses amongolder employees, although exclusively for those employed in large organizations.

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