Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers

American Political Science Review (Impact Factor: 3.93). 02/2004; 98(01). DOI: 10.1017/S000305540400098X
Source: OAI


This paper examines the bases of opposition to immigrant minorities in Western Europe, focusing on The Netherlands. The specific aim of this study is to test the validity of predictions derived from two theories98. The experiments, combined with parallel individual-level measures, allow measurement of the comparative impact of both dispositionally based and situationally triggered threats to economic well-being and to national identity at work. The results show, first, that considerations of national identity dominate those of economic advantage in evoking exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities and, second, that the effect of situational triggers is to mobilize support for exclusionary policies above and beyond the core constituency already predisposed to support them.

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Available from: Louk Hagendoorn, Jul 14, 2014
    • "Most survey experiments exploring immigration attitudes randomly vary only one or two attributes at a time using vignettes or short characterizations (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hopkins 2013; Sniderman et al. 2004; Valentino and Iyengar 2011). Conjoint analysis, however, exposes subjects to numerous randomly varied immigrant characteristics simultaneously, and this permits us to disentangle the independent influence of each (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2014). "

    Political Behavior 07/2015; DOI:10.1007/s11109-015-9311-y · 1.63 Impact Factor
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    • "Hopkins [29] identifies conditions that make a community more likely to be hostile to immigration. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior [40] find that Dutch citizens favor immigration by highly educated workers, and not by those who are only suited for unskilled jobs. "
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