La relation d'autorité employeur-employé. Une approche conventionnaliste
ABSTRACT Given the distinction between power and authority, our aim in this paper is to set forth a framework for the analysis of the authority relation and the associated commanding within the firm based on the economics of convention. We begin by building a general model of the ?authority convention,? distinguishing between two levels, namely, the ?constitutive convention? and the ?regulative convention.? We then argue that the authority convention is subjected to legitimization constraints which may produce divergence and conflict. Finally, we turn to the question of the efficiency of the authority convention. The issues of coordination and cooperation cannot be separated from those of legitimacy and conflict that arise in the employment relation. Classification JEL : L 20, Z10
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ABSTRACT: This paper assesses how two traditions, namely the economics of contracts and the economics of conventions, incorporate the legal framework of the labor relation in their analysis of the employment relationship. A comparison of these views not only offers different conceptions of the employment relationship, but also gives some indication as to the links between economic analysis and the national legal environment. Indeed, the theory of contracts is of Anglo-Saxon origin while the economics of convention is a French school of thought. Two questions are addressed to these traditions. First, how important are legal rules for the analytical construction (positive aspect)? And, second, how are these legal rules perceived in terms of efficiency (normative aspect)? Classification JEL : Z10Revue économique. 01/2008; 59(2):213-239.