Trade Policy and Firm Boundaries

ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Working Papers ECARES 01/2010;
Source: RePEc


We develop an endogenous growth model with R&D spillovers to study the long-run consequences of offshoring with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts. In so doing, we model offshoring as the geographical fragmentation of a firm's production chain between a home upstream division and a foreign downstream division. While there is always a positive correlation between upstream bargaining weight and offshoring activities, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between these and growth. Whether offshoring with incomplete contracts also increases consumption depends on firm heterogeneity. As for welfare, whereas with complete contracts an R&D subsidy is enough to solve the inefficiency due to R&D spillovers, with incomplete contracts a production subsidy is also needed. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2009 .

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