The Military Balance in the Middle East: An Executive Summary

Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper Series 01/1999;
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT This policy paper is part of the “Arms Control and Security Improvement in the Middle East†workshop series, sponsored by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California. The project is a Track II (unofficial) activity which indirectly supports the Middle East peace process. It is also part of an ongoing effort by the IGCC to study the causes and dynamics of international conflict and help devise options for managing and resolving it through international cooperation. The third meeting concentrated on regional security trends in military balances, weapons effects and doctrines, and the role of the military in improving regional security. Dr. Anthony Cordesman presented Middle East military balances and arms transfer trends for the last decade, based on his analysis of the military training, professionalism, and equipment holdings of various Middle East states. This paper summarizes his findings.

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