Effect of Financial Incentives on Improvement in Medical Quality Indicators for Primary Care
ABSTRACT The efficacy of rewarding physicians financially for preventive services is unproven. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of a physician pay-for-performance program similar to the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting Initiative program on quality of preventive care in a network of community health centers.
A retrospective review of administrative data was done to evaluate a natural quasi-experiment in a network of publicly funded primary care clinics. Physicians in 6 of 11 clinics were given a financial incentive twice the size of the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' incentive for achieving group targets in preventive care that included cervical cancer screening, mammography, and pediatric immunization. They also received productivity incentives. Six years of performance indicators were compared between incentivized and nonincentivized clinics. We also surveyed the incentivized clinicians about their perception of the incentive program.
Although some performance indicators improved for all measures and all clinics, there were no clinically significant differences between clinics that had incentives and those that did not. A linear trend test approached conventional significance levels for Papanicolaou smears (P = .08) but was of very modest magnitude compared with observed nonlinear variations; there was no suggestion of a linear trend for mammography or pediatric immunizations. The survey revealed that most physicians felt the incentives were not very effective in improving quality of care.
We found no evidence for a clinically significant effect of financial incentives on performance of preventive care in these community health centers. Based on our findings and others, we believe there is great need for more research with strong research designs to determine the effects, both positive and negative, of financial incentives on clinical quality indicators in primary care.
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ABSTRACT: Primary care providers frequently recommend, administer, or prescribe health care services that are unlikely to benefit their patients. Yet little is known about how to reduce provider overuse behavior. In the absence of a theoretically grounded causal framework, it is difficult to predict the contexts under which different types of interventions to reduce provider overuse will succeed and under which they will fail. In this article, we present a framework based on the theory of planned behavior that is designed to guide overuse research and intervention development. We describe categories of primary care provider beliefs that lead to the formation of intentions to assess the appropriateness of services, and propose factors that may affect whether the presence of assessment intentions results in an appropriate recommendation. Interventions that have been commonly used to address provider overuse behavior are reviewed within the context of the framework.Medical Care Research and Review 08/2013; 70(5). DOI:10.1177/1077558713496166 · 2.57 Impact Factor
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ABSTRACT: Primary care reform in Ontario, Canada started with the introduction of new enrollment models, the two largest of which are Family Health Networks (FHNs), a capitation-based model, and Family Health Groups (FHGs), a blended fee-for-service model. The purpose of this study was to evaluate differences in performance between FHNs and FHGs and to compare performance before and after physicians joined these new primary care groups. This study used Ontario administrative claims data to compare performance measures in FHGs and FHNs. The study population included physicians who belonged to a FHN or FHG for at least two years. Patients were included in the analyses if they enrolled with a physician in the two years after the physician joined a FHN or FHG, and also if they saw the physician in a two year period prior to the physician joining a FHN or FHG. Performance was derived from the administrative data, and included measures of preventive screening for cancer (breast, cervical, colorectal) and chronic disease management (diabetes, heart failure, asthma). Performance measures did not vary consistently between models. In some cases, performance approached current benchmarks (Pap smears, mammograms). In other cases it was improving in relation to previous measures (colorectal cancer screening). There were no changes in screening for cervical cancer or breast cancer after joining either a FHN or FHG. Colorectal cancer screening increased in both FHNs and FHGs. After enrolling in either a FHG or a FHN, prescribing performance measures for diabetes care improved. However, annual eye examinations decreased for younger people with diabetes after joining a FHG or FHN. There were no changes in performance measures for heart failure management or asthma care after enrolling in either a FHG or FHN. Some improvements in preventive screening and diabetes management which were seen amongst people after they enrolled may be attributed to incentive payments offered to physicians within FHGs and FHNs. However, these primary care delivery models need to be compared with other delivery models and fee for service practices in order to describe more specifically what aspects of model delivery and incentives affect care.BMC Family Practice 06/2011; 12:44. DOI:10.1186/1471-2296-12-44 · 1.74 Impact Factor