On Ping-Pong protocol and its variant

Source: arXiv


We discuss the Ping-Pong protocol which was proposed by Bostroem and Felbinger. We derive a simple trade-off inequality between distinguishability of messages for Eve and detectability of Eve for legitimate users. Our inequality holds for arbitrary initial states. That is, even if Eve prepares an initial state, she cannot distinguish messages without being detected. We show that the same inequality holds also on another protocol in which Alice and Bob use one-way quantum communication channel twice.

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Available from: Hideki Imai, Oct 03, 2015
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