Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of public goods games.

School of Science, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China.
Physical Review E (Impact Factor: 2.33). 12/2009; 80(6 Pt 1):061104. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.061104
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners' payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players' decision. Finally, we explicitly demonstrate a rock-scissors-paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model.


Available from: Zhaojin Xu, Dec 15, 2013
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