Conference Paper

# Self-optimizing Peer-to-Peer Networks with Selfish Processes

Univ. of Iowa, Iowa City

DOI: 10.1109/SASO.2007.51 Conference: Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems, 2007. SASO '07. First International Conference on Source: IEEE Xplore

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**ABSTRACT:**Complex features, such as temporal dependencies and numerical cost constraints, are hallmarks of real-world planning problems. In this article, we consider the challenging problem of cost-sensitive temporally expressive (CSTE) planning, which requires concurrency of durative actions and optimization of action costs. We first propose a scheme to translate a CSTE planning problem to a minimum cost (MinCost) satisfiability (SAT) problem and to integrate with a relaxed parallel planning semantics for handling true temporal expressiveness. Our scheme finds solution plans that optimize temporal makespan, and also minimize total action costs at the optimal makespan. We propose two approaches for solving MinCost SAT. The first is based on a transformation of a MinCost SAT problem to a weighted partial Max-SAT (WPMax-SAT), and the second, called BB-CDCL, is an integration of the branch-and-bound technique and the conflict driven clause learning (CDCL) method. We also develop a CSTE customized variable branching scheme for BB-CDCL which can significantly improve the search efficiency. Our experiments on the existing CSTE benchmark domains show that our planner compares favorably to the state-of-the-art temporally expressive planners in both efficiency and quality.ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST). 12/2013; 5(1). - [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]

**ABSTRACT:**The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, we specify what it means for a fixed point of a stabilizing distributed system to be a Nash equilibrium. Second, we present methods that can be used to verify whether or not a given fixed point of a given stabilizing distributed system is a Nash equilibrium. Third, we argue that in a stabilizing distributed system, whose fixed points are all Nash equilibria, no process has an incentive to perturb its local state, after the system reaches one fixed point, in order to force the system to reach another fixed point where the perturbing process achieves a better gain. If the fixed points of a stabilizing distributed system are all Nash equilibria, then we refer to the system as perturbation-proof. Otherwise, we refer to the system as perturbation-prone. We identify four natural classes of perturbation-(proof/prone) systems. We present system examples for three of these classes of systems, and show that the fourth class is empty.Theoretical Computer Science 07/2011; 412(33):4325–4335. · 0.52 Impact Factor - [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]

**ABSTRACT:**The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, we specify what it means for a fixed point of a stabilizing distributed system to be a Nash equilibrium. Second, we present methods that can be used to verify whether or not a given fixed point of a given stabilizing distributed system is a Nash equilibrium. Third, we argue that in a stabilizing distributed system, whose fixed points are all Nash equilibria, no process has an incentive to perturb its local state, after the system reaches one fixed point, in order to force the system to reach another fixed point where the perturbing process achieves a better gain. If the fixed points of a stabilizing distributed system are all Nash equilibria, then we refer to the system as perturbation-proof. Otherwise, we refer to the system as perturbation-prone. We identify four natural classes of perturbation-(proof/prone) systems. We present system examples for three of these classes of systems, and show that the fourth class is empty.11/2009: pages 311-324;

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