Conference Paper

Network forensics: towards a classification of traceback mechanisms

Dept. of Informatics, Piraeus Univ., Greece
DOI: 10.1109/SECCMW.2005.1588288 Conference: Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks, 2005. Workshop of the 1st International Conference on
Source: IEEE Xplore

ABSTRACT The traceback problem is one of the hardest in information security and has always been the utmost solution to holding attackers accountable for their actions. This paper presents a brief overview of the traceback problem, while discussing the features of software, network and computer forensics. In the rest of this paper, various traceback mechanisms are examined while categorized according to their features and modes of operation. Finally, we propose a classification schema for all traceback methods in order to assess and combine their benefits so as to provide enough information for digital forensics analyses, thus getting -the right way- one step closer to the actual attacker.

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