La influencia de los procesos controlados en el razonamiento con Teoría de la Mente (ToM) en niños con y sin discapacidad intelectual

Revista latinoamericana de psicología (Impact Factor: 0.64). 01/2009;
Source: DOAJ


La capacidad o mecanismo tácito de atribuir estados mentales a los otros y a uno mismo, con el objeto de anticipar, comprender y predecir la conducta, es conocida como Teoría de la Mente (ToM). Parte de la discusión se centra en comprender si este razonamiento es un proceso independiente o subordinado a los procesos ejecutivos de control consciente. En esta investigación se analiza el efecto de las funciones ejecutivas de control consciente en tareas de razonamiento con ToM, en niños con y sin discapacidad intelectual. La muestra la constituyen 30 niños con discapacidad intelectual y 20 niños sin discapacidad intelectual. Se hipotetizó que la habilidad para responder las preguntas de control, una operacionalización de las funciones ejecutivas de control consciente, se asocia más a las tareas de segundo orden que a las de primer orden, ya que estas requieren mayor carga representacional. Los resultados obtenidos, sugieren que los procesos de control consciente no sólo se asocian a las tareas que requieren una mayor carga representacional, sino a todas las tareas que requieren razonar con estados mentales, sean ellos de primer o segundo orden.

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Available from: Sergio Chaigneau, Oct 08, 2015
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